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THE SUBTLY IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENTARY
PAYMENTS PROVISION IN LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
Douglas R. Richmond
I. INTRODUCTION
Liability insurance is essentially litigation insurance.1  Liability in-
surance may be so described because of the insurer’s duty to defend
the insured against lawsuits and equivalent proceedings that the policy
potentially covers.2  In a typical case, the insurer hires a lawyer to de-
fend the insured and thereafter controls the insured’s defense in the
litigation.3  The insured has a corresponding obligation to allow the
insurer to control the defense and to cooperate with the insurer in the
process.4  If the insured prevails in the trial court and the plaintiff ap-
peals, the insurer generally must defend the appeal.5  If the insured
loses in the trial court, then the insurer’s duty to defend may obligate
it to pursue an appeal on the insured’s behalf.6
* Managing Director, Aon Risk Solutions, Overland Park, Kansas.  Opinions expressed in
this Article are solely those of the author.
1. Cont’l Res., Inc. v. C & D Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-154, 2015 WL 4417323, at *5 n.2
(D.N.D. July 20, 2015); Lott v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 2d 626, 630 (E.D. Va. 2011);
Miller v. Westport Ins. Corp., 200 P.3d 419, 423 (Kan. 2009) (quoting ROBERT H. JERRY, II &
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 826 (4th ed. 2007)); BGE Home
Prods. & Servs., Inc. v. Owens, 833 A.2d 8, 14 (Md. 2003) (quoting Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 347 A.2d 842, 851 (Md. 1975)); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Golden, 766 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Mass.
2002) (quoting Rubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 708 N.E.2d 639, 642 (Mass. 1999)); Auto.
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cook, 850 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (N.Y. 2006) (quoting Seaboard Sur. Co. v.
Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272, 275 (N.Y. 1974)).
2. While a standard liability insurance policy obligates the insurer to defend the insured
against “suits” seeking covered damages and insurers routinely defend insureds in civil litigation,
courts have held various actions to be “the functional equivalent of a suit.”  1 ALLAN D. WINDT,
INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4:1, at 4-4 to -5 (6th ed. 2013).  These include arbitrations
and administrative proceedings. Id. § 4:1, at 4-5 n.4 (collecting cases).
3. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373–74 (Fla. 1995).
4. Id. at 374.
5. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 849
(5th ed. 2012).
6. See, e.g., Associated Auto. Inc. v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 714, 725
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (stating that absent contrary policy language, “an insurer’s duty to defend in-
cludes a duty to appeal an adverse judgment against its insured if there are reasonable grounds
for the appeal”).  An insurer’s duty to defend does not, however, give rise to a duty to appeal
every adverse judgment against an insured. See, e.g., First Advantage Litig. Consulting, LLC v.
763
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Most liability insurance policies obligate the insurer to pay the de-
fense lawyer’s fees and other defense costs in addition to the policy’s
liability limits.7  This obligation flows from the policy’s supplementary
payments provision.  A standard commercial general liability (CGL)
policy provides:
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS – COVERAGES A AND B
1. We will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle,
or any “suit” against an insured we defend:
a. All expenses we incur.
b. Up to $250 for cost of bail bonds required because of acci-
dents or traffic law violations arising out of the use of any
vehicle to which the Bodily Injury Liability Coverage ap-
plies. We do not have to furnish these bonds.
c. The cost of bonds to release attachments, but only for bond
amounts within the applicable limit of insurance. We do not
have to furnish these bonds.
d. All reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at our re-
quest to assist us in the investigation or defense of the claim
or “suit”, including actual loss of earnings up to $250 a day
because of time off from work.
e. All court costs taxed against the insured in the “suit”.  How-
ever, these payments do not include attorneys’ fees or attor-
neys’ expenses taxed against the insured.
f. Prejudgment interest awarded against the insured on that
part of the judgment we pay.  If we make an offer to pay the
applicable limit of insurance, we will not pay any prejudg-
ment interest based on that period of time after the offer.
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues
after entry of the judgment and before we have paid, of-
fered to pay, or deposited in court the part of the judgment
that is within the applicable limit of insurance.
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance.8
Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 525 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the insurers
did not have a duty to defend First Advantage through appeal where, given the verdict, there
was no basis on which they would have to indemnify First Advantage).  For example, where an
adverse judgment is within the policy limits, the insurer may opt to satisfy the judgment rather
than appeal. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 851.  Or, an insurer might choose to settle R
with a plaintiff in exchange for a complete release of the insured rather than appeal. See Bruce
v. Junghun, 912 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (suggesting this possibility).
7. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 784 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2015).
8. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13), at
8–9 (2012).  “Coverage A” refers to coverage for bodily injury and property damage liability,
while “Coverage B” refers to coverage for personal and advertising injury liability. Id. at 1, 6.
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Homeowners and auto insurance policies also contain supplemen-
tary payments provisions.  For example, a standard homeowner’s in-
surance policy provides:
We cover the following in addition to the limits of liability:
A. Claim Expenses
We pay:
1. Expenses we incur and costs taxed against an “insured” in
any suit we defend;
2. Premiums on bonds required in a suit we defend, but not
for bond amounts more than the Coverage E limit of liabil-
ity.  We need not apply for or furnish any bond;
3. Reasonable expenses incurred by an “insured” at our re-
quest, including actual loss of earnings (but not loss of
other income) up to $250 per day, for assisting us in the
investigation or defense of a claim or suit; and
4. Interest on the entire judgment which accrues after entry
of the judgment and before we pay or tender, or deposit in
court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the
limit of liability that applies.9
The supplementary payments provision is an essential part of liabil-
ity insurance policies.  The insurer’s obligation to pay defense costs, in
addition to the liability limits of its policy, is particularly important
because defense costs can—and often do—exceed policy limits.10  But
as its language makes clear, a supplementary payments provision is
more than just a mechanism for funding a defense.  By providing for
the payment of defense costs outside of the policy limits, a supplemen-
tary payments provision assures all concerned that the insurer will
have its full policy limits available to settle a case or to indemnify the
insured in the event of an adverse judgment.  Where a supplementary
payments provision obligates the insurer to pay court costs taxed
against the insured or interest on a judgment against the insured, it
offers valuable benefits that complement the insurer’s duty to indem-
nify the insured against covered losses.
At the same time, it is important to understand what a supplemen-
tary payments provision does not do.  First, a supplementary payments
provision does not create coverage.11  Coverage under the policy is
9. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners–3 Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 20–21 (2010).
The “Coverage E” referred to in paragraph 2 of the supplementary payments provision is the
“Personal Liability” coverage afforded by a standard homeowners insurance policy. Id. at 20.
10. Timothy H. Wright, Key Coverage Issues Presented by the Supplementary Payments Provi-
sion, NEW APPLEMAN CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INS. LAW, Spring 2016, at 53, 54.
11. Hargob Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 901 N.Y.S.2d 657, 660 (App. Div.
2010).
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created by the insuring agreements.12  Second, a supplementary pay-
ments provision does not increase the policy’s liability limits; the pol-
icy’s liability limits are always those stated in the declarations.13  Thus,
and by way of example, a provision stating that the insurer will pay
pre- or post-judgment interest or first aid expenses does not increase
the policy limits for purposes of determining in a bad faith case
whether the plaintiff offered to settle within the limits.14  Third, a sup-
plementary payments provision does not create or expand an insurer’s
duty to defend.15  Again, it simply enables the insurer’s payment of
defense expenses in addition to its policy limits.  Furthermore, the ob-
ligation to pay defense expenses is limited to cases the insurer actually
defends.16  A supplementary payments provision neither requires the
insurer to reimburse the insured’s expenses in a case the insured de-
fends without the insurer’s participation, nor requires the insurer to
pay the insured’s pre-tender defense expenses.17  Fourth, a supple-
mentary payments provision does not grant third parties rights under
the policy.18  A supplementary payments provision is intended to ben-
efit the insured, not strangers to the contract.19  Third parties are at
12. Id.
13. Levin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 510 S.W.2d 455, 458–59 (Mo. 1974); see Levit v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 764 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (App. Div. 2003) (explaining that a policy’s “limit of
insurance” and “applicable policy limits” do not include costs and interest payable under a sup-
plementary payments provision).
14. Levin, 510 S.W.2d at 458–59.
15. An insurer’s duty to defend flows from the insuring agreements in its policy. See, e.g., Ins.
Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13), at 1 (2012)
(stating in the bodily injury and property damage insuring agreement: “We will have the right
and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.  However, we will have
no duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ to which this insurance does not apply.”).
16. Amex Assur. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744, 750 (Ct. App. 2003); Interface
Flooring Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. X02CV930151595S, 2001 WL 238148, at *14–15
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2001) (applying Georgia law).
17. Interface Flooring Sys., Inc., 2001 WL 238148, at *11, 14–15.
18. See, e.g., DeMent v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 544 S.E.2d 797, 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)
(discussing a first aid clause in a supplementary payments provision in a personal auto policy).
19. Mulvey Constr., Inc. v. BITCO Gen. Life Ins. Corp., No. 1:07-0634, 2015 WL 6394521, at
*8 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 22, 2015); see, e.g., San Diego Hous. Comm’n v. Indus. Indem. Co., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 103, 120–22 (Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that a judgment creditor could not recover
under a supplementary payments provision on a third-party beneficiary theory); Town & Coun-
try Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 538 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“[G]iven that the clearly stated
purpose of the [first aid or Good Samaritan clause in the supplementary payments provision]
was to reimburse only the insured for any expenditures incurred in obtaining medical relief for
others . . . the [plaintiffs] fall outside the scope of the coverage provided . . . .”); McCarter v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 388 N.Y.S.2d 732, 732–33 (App. Div. 1976) (“Under the circumstances
presented, the provision for indemnity in [the first aid or Good Samaritan clause in the supple-
mentary payments provision] runs to the insured for expenses incurred by him, and no cause of
action exists on behalf of this plaintiff, who is not such an insured party . . . .”).
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best incidental beneficiaries of supplementary payments provisions
and cannot enforce them.20
As important as supplementary payments provisions are to both in-
sureds and insurers, related caselaw is relatively scarce,21 and they
have drawn little scholarly attention.  As a result, courts and lawyers
have little authority to guide them when analyzing associated issues.
This Article aims to fill that void.
Our exploration of supplementary payments provisions begins in
Part II with a discussion of an insurer’s obligation to pay attorneys’
fees or costs assessed against an insured, or interest on a judgment
awarded against an insured, in a case in which the insurer defends but
does not indemnify the insured.  Under the majority approach, an in-
surer’s supplementary payments obligation is linked to coverage,
meaning that the insurer has no duty to pay these items where it has
no duty to indemnify the insured.  After reviewing the majority rule
and the minority view, which uncouples an insurer’s supplementary
payments obligation from its duty to indemnify, Part II concludes that
the majority approach represents the correct approach.
Part III examines insureds’ repeated allegation that a supplemen-
tary payments provision that states the insurer will pay the insured’s
reasonable expenses incurred at the insurer’s request requires the in-
surer to pay the insured’s attorneys’ fees incurred litigating coverage
with the insurer.  Insureds contend—and some courts have agreed—
that by filing a declaratory judgment action against its insured, an in-
surer “requests” that the insured incur associated fees and costs.  The
majority rule, however, rejects this theory as word play that is incon-
sistent with the parties’ intent.  Part III endorses the majority rule.
Part IV analyzes insurers’ obligations to pay premiums for appeal
or supersedeas bonds, and bonds to release attachments.  In doing so,
it discusses the most commonly disputed issues in this area: whether
an insurer must pay the premium for an appeal or supersedeas bond
where its policy is silent on that obligation; whether an insurer must
pay for an appeal or supersedeas bond to cover the portion of a judg-
ment that exceeds the applicable liability limit of its policy; and
whether an insurer that pays the cost of a bond to release an attach-
ment can confine its obligation to bond amounts within the applicable
limit of insurance.
20. DeMent, 544 S.E.2d at 801.
21. See Michael Sean Quinn & Olga Seelig, Liability Insurance and Supplementary Payments,
25 INS. LITIG. REP. 133, 133 (2003) (stating that “[t]here is remarkably little law” on supplemen-
tary payments provisions).
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Part V discusses pre- and post-judgment interest as supplementary
payments.  It focuses on (a) the scope of the insurer’s obligation to
pay post-judgment interest; and (b) an insurer’s ability to terminate its
post-judgment interest obligation by offering to pay the applicable lia-
bility limit of its policy.
Part VI looks at first aid or Good Samaritan clauses in supplemen-
tary payments provisions.  For example, a Good Samaritan clause
might state that the insurer will pay, in addition to its limit of liability,
expenses the insured incurs “for immediate medical and surgical treat-
ment for others necessary and the time of the accident resulting in
bodily injury” covered by the policy.22  These clauses benefit the in-
sured, not a third party who is injured as a result of the insured’s con-
duct.  Third parties have no right to claim benefits under them.  As
Part VI further explains, an insured does not “incur” a plaintiff’s med-
ical expenses as a result of tort liability imposed by a judgment.
Finally, Part VII discusses an insurer’s duty to defend a contractual
indemnitee of the insured under the supplementary payments provi-
sion in a standard CGL policy.  As a consequence of the many condi-
tions attached to the insurer’s promise to defend the insured’s
indemnitee and to treat attendant litigation expenses as supplemen-
tary payments, the insurer’s obligation will arise in very few cases.
II. SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS IN CASES WHERE THE INSURER
HAS A DUTY TO DEFEND BUT ULTIMATELY NO DUTY TO
INDEMNIFY THE INSURED
Liability insurers owe insureds two distinct contractual duties: a
duty to defend them in litigation and equivalent proceedings, and a
duty to indemnify them against covered judgments.23  Although courts
regularly say that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to in-
demnify,24 both duties are linked to coverage;25 their differences are
22. Farmers Ins. Grp., E-Z Reader Car Policy (56-5058 3d ed. 5-07), at 5, http://doi.nv.gov/up
loadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Consumers/56-5058.pdf.
23. Allen v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 436 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo. 2014); Summerhaze Co., L.C. v.
FDIC, 332 P.3d 908, 920 (Utah 2014); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Speed, 317 P.3d 532, 538
(Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
24. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Advantage Med. Elecs., LLC, 196 So. 3d 238, 243
(Ala. 2015); Devine v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 350 P.3d 782, 788 (Alaska 2015); Quihuis v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 P.3d 719, 727 (Ariz. 2014); Kolbek v. Truck Ins. Exch., 431 S.W.3d
900, 905 (Ark. 2014); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distrib., Inc., 326 P.3d 253, 258 (Cal. 2014);
Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 961, 988 n.36 (Conn. 2013); Carlyle Inv.
Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 131 A.3d 886, 896 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Patterson, 564 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2009)); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 321 P.3d 634,
640 (Haw. 2014); AMCO Ins. Co. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 2016 IL App (1st) 142660, ¶¶ 31–32, 49
N.E.3d 900, 913–14; Piatt v. Ind. Lumbermen’s Mut. Ins. Co., 461 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Mo. 2015);
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attributable to their conditions.  The duty to indemnify exists as soon
as the contract is formed, but it is conditional; it is not due and owing
until the insured’s liability is established.26  The duty to defend is not
so conditioned; it exists as soon as a claimant pleads allegations poten-
tially within coverage, regardless of whether the law would impose
liability in the circumstances.27  Because the duty to indemnify is con-
ditioned on the insured’s liability and the duty to defend is not subject
to the same condition, the duty to defend is triggered in more cases.28
This imbalance does not, however, alter the essential relationship be-
tween the duty to defend and the existence of coverage.29
Because an insurer’s duty to defend arises at the outset of litigation
while its duty to indemnify is determined at the conclusion of the liti-
gation, an insurer may have to defend a case in which it will have no
Cizek Homes, Inc. v. Columbia Nat’l Ins. Co., 853 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Neb. Ct. App. 2014); Scotts-
dale Indem. Co. v. Beckerman, 992 N.Y.S.2d 117, 120 (App. Div. 2014); Granger v. Auto-Own-
ers Ins., 40 N.E.3d 1110, 1115 (Ohio 2015); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 131
A.3d 445, 456 (Pa. 2015); Demaray v. De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 801 N.W.2d 284, 287 (S.D.
2011); AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 715 S.E.2d 28, 32 (Va. 2011) (quoting Va. Elec. & Power
Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 264, 265–66 (Va. 1996)); Water Well Sols.
Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Consol. Ins. Co., 881 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Wis. 2016).
25. See F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 352 P.3d 612, 614 (Mont.
2015) (“An insurer’s duty to defend or indemnify a party depends on whether an insurance
policy establishes such a duty.”); Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 689 A.2d 1089, 1095
(Pa. 1997) (“Although the duty to defend is separate from and broader than the duty to indem-
nify, both duties flow from a determination that the complaint triggers coverage.”); City of
Hartsville v. S.C. Mun. Ins. & Risk Fin. Fund, 677 S.E.2d 574, 578 (S.C. 2009) (observing that an
insurer’s duties to defend and indemnify “are interrelated”).
26. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LogistiCare Sols., LLC, 751 F.3d 684, 692 (5th Cir. 2014)
(applying Mississippi law and quoting Estate of Bradley v. Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 647 F.3d
524, 529 (5th Cir. 2011)); Buss v. Super. Ct., 939 P.2d 766, 773 (Cal. 1997); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Young, 2012 IL App (1st) 103736, ¶ 12, 968 N.E.2d 759, 763 (citing Outboard Marine
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1221 (Ill. 1992)); Irving Oil Ltd. v. ACE INA
Ins. Co., 91 A.3d 594, 599 (Me. 2014); Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co.,
819 N.W.2d 602, 616 (Minn. 2012); Barron v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 220 S.W.3d 746, 747 (Mo.
2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freyer, 312 P.3d 403, 410–11 (Mont. 2013); Mid-Conti-
nent Cas. Co. v. Castagna, 410 S.W.3d 445, 449–50 (Tex. App. 2013).
27. See Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., 657 F.3d 1135, 1142 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating
that the merits of a suit have “no bearing” on the duty to defend); Hart v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
272 P.3d 1215, 1225 (Haw. 2012) (quoting two Hawaii Supreme Court cases); Renco Grp., Inc. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 362 S.W.3d 472, 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that
an insurer has a duty to defend “based on the facts known at the outset of the case, no matter
how unlikely it is that the insured will be found liable or whether the insured is ultimately found
liable”); Abouzaid v. Mansard Gardens Assocs., LLC, 23 A.3d 338, 347 (N.J. 2011) (stating that
when evaluating an insurer’s duty to defend, “the potential merit of the claim is immaterial”);
Tibert v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 31, 44 (N.D. 2012) (stating that “the ultimate result in
the case does not affect the duty to defend”).
28. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 794. R
29. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL301.txt unknown Seq: 8 30-AUG-17 12:41
770 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:763
duty to indemnify the insured.30  Where the insurer recognizes this
possibility, it typically defends the insured under a reservation of
rights.31  In short, the insurer agrees to defend the insured while re-
serving its right not to indemnify the insured in the end.32  The insurer
may also file a declaratory judgment action to determine its obliga-
tions under its policy.33
An insurer that defends an insured under a reservation of rights
must pay for the insured’s defense as the litigation proceeds, just as it
would do if it were defending the action without reservation.34  Ques-
tions arise, however, where the insurer is ultimately held to owe no
duty to indemnify the insured.  Does the insurer’s promise in its sup-
plementary payments provision to pay “with respect to . . . any ‘suit’
against an insured we defend” post-judgment interest accrued before
the insurer has paid, offered to pay, or deposited into court the part of
the judgment that is within the applicable policy limits oblige it to pay
interest on a judgment it does not owe?35  Must the insurer pay costs
taxed against the insured even if a court hearing a related declaratory
judgment action or equitable garnishment case decides that the in-
surer’s policy does not afford coverage?  Most courts answer these
questions “no,”36 although there are competing minority views.37
30. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. DP Eng’g, L.L.C., 827 F.3d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying
Texas law); N. Counties Eng’g, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726, 739 (Ct.
App. 2014); Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 132350, ¶ 19, 26
N.E.3d 421, 426; Arch Ins. Co. v. Sunset Fin. Servs., Inc., 475 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015) (quoting Lumber Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reload, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003));
Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Cook, 850 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (N.Y. 2006); ZRZ Realty Co. v.
Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 266 P.3d 61, 66 (Or. 2011).
31. WILLIAM T. BARKER & RONALD D. KENT, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITI-
GATION SECOND EDITION § 3.03[1], at 3–33 (2010 & Supp. 2013).
32. See Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co., 730 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ga. 2012) (“A reservation of
rights is . . . designed to allow an insurer to provide a defense to its insured while still preserving
the option of litigating and ultimately denying coverage.”); Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut.
Ins. Co., 884 N.E.2d 1130, 1139–40 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] reservation of rights means that
the insurer does not believe that coverage is available . . . but that it is proceeding to defend a
claim in order to control the defense.”).
33. See Gregory P. Deschens & Kurt M. Mullen, Determining the Insurer’s Response, in 1 NEW
APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 11.13[1], at 11-1, 11-47 (Leo P. Martinez et al.,
eds. 2016 ed.) (“[I]f the insurer is defending . . . under a ‘reservation of rights’ but nonetheless
would like to challenge its duty to defend, initiating a declaratory judgment action . . . may be
the wisest and safest course of action.”); 2 WINDT, supra note 2, § 8:3, at 8-5 to -12 (discussing R
why an insurer may pursue a declaratory judgment action).
34. Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 542–43 & n.14 (Pa. 2010).
35. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13), at
8–9 (2012).
36. See, e.g., Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.3d 625, 631–32 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (apply-
ing District of Columbia law and discussing post-judgment interest); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. City of
Hazelton, No. 3:07-CV-1704, 2009 WL 1507161, at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2009) (discussing costs
taxed against an insured); State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 855 (Ct.
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A. Linking Supplementary Payments to Coverage
Athridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.38 is a leading case in this
area. Athridge arose out of the serious injury of Tommy Athridge,
who was run over by his teenage friend Jorge Iglesias during an ill-
conceived game of chicken, in which Iglesias was in his cousins’ car
and Athridge was afoot.39  Iglesias had secretly taken the car from his
cousins’ home.40  Tommy and his father sued Iglesias and won a $5.5
million judgment that Iglesias could not pay.41  They then tried to col-
lect the judgment from Aetna, which insured Iglesias under a personal
auto policy.42  A jury determined that Aetna did not owe coverage for
the accident because Iglesias did not reasonably believe that he was
entitled to drive his cousins’ car.43  The Athridges asserted that even if
Aetna had no duty to indemnify Iglesias for the judgment, it was nev-
ertheless obligated to pay post-judgment interest on the award be-
cause it had defended Iglesias in the tort case.44  The district court
disagreed and awarded Aetna summary judgment, and the Athridges
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.45
The Athridges were acutely interested in collecting post-judgment
interest from Aetna because by this time, the accumulated interest
App. 2009) (discussing costs taxed against an insured and post-judgment interest); Golden Eagle
Ins. Corp. v. Cen-Fed, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 292–93 (Ct. App. 2007) (involving costs as-
sessed against an insured); Combs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917, 923 (Ct.
App. 2006) (discussing costs assessed against an insured); First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Nationwide
Sec. Servs., Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 143924, ¶¶ 39–41, 54 N.E.3d 323, 335 (involving pre- and
post-judgment interest); Hanneman v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 454–55 (N.D. 1998)
(discussing costs taxed against an insured); World Harvest Church v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 68
N.E.3d 738, 746–47 (Ohio 2016) (involving a fee award and post-judgment interest); see also
Wright, supra note 10, at 54 (“Insureds have argued that this prefatory clause requires insurers R
to make supplementary payments for any lawsuit they defend under a reservation of rights,
regardless of whether there is coverage . . . or a duty to defend.  Most courts have rejected that
argument.”) (footnote omitted).
37. See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Alex Hofrichter, P.A., 670 So. 2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996) (stating that because the insurer defended the insured, “substantive coverage was not
necessary to trigger the obligation to pay costs taxed against the insured”); Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Donnelly, 300 P.3d 31, 35 (Idaho 2013) (concluding that the insurer was obligated to pay
attorneys’ fees and costs taxed against the insured even though it had no duty to indemnify the
insured); Pasco v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 99AP-430, 1999 WL 1221633, at *4–5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 1999) (holding that the insurer had to pay costs assessed against the insured even
though its policy did not cover the related cause of action).
38. 604 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
39. Id. at 628.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 628–29.
43. Id. at 628.
44. Athridge, 604 F.3d at 629.
45. Id.
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exceeded $3 million.46  They contended that Aetna owed this amount
under its policy’s supplementary payments provision, which stated
that Aetna would pay on an insured’s behalf “[i]nterest accruing after
a judgment is entered in any suit we defend.”47  The Athridges argued
that this language required Aetna to pay post-judgment interest any
time it defended a lawsuit against an insured, regardless of whether it
owed coverage for the judgment.48  As they saw things, the only way
for Aetna to terminate its duty to pay post-judgment interest would be
to pay a judgment it did not owe.49  The district court rejected this
argument, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.50
Like the district court, the appellate court reasoned that an insurer’s
obligation to pay post-judgment interest under its supplementary pay-
ments provision is contingent upon its duty to indemnify the insured.51
The court observed that because an insurer’s duty to defend is
broader than its duty to indemnify, an insurer frequently will defend
an insured even though exclusions in the policy may absolve the in-
surer of its duty to indemnify the insured.52  To adopt the Athridges’
view that Aetna had to accept liability for a judgment to avoid paying
post-judgment interest potentially exceeding its policy limits would ef-
fectively erase the exclusions in the policy in any case Aetna de-
fended.53  This would, in turn, violate the court’s duty to construe the
Aetna policy “‘as a whole, giving effect to each of its provisions,
where possible.’”54
Pushing back, the Athridges pointed to cases in which courts held
that insurers had a duty to pay costs assessed against insureds even
though the insurers had no duty to satisfy the judgments.55  The court
was unimpressed, reasoning that the cases did not support “allowing
the defense of a suit to create de facto indemnification liability.”56
Finally, the Athridges argued that although the court’s policy inter-
pretation was plausible, the doctrine of contra proferentem compelled
the court to construe the policy as they did.57  But as the court ex-
46. Id. at 631.
47. Id. (quoting the Aetna policy).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Athridge, 604 F.3d at 631.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Stevens v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 801 A.2d 61, 67 (D.C. 2002)).
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Akassy v. William Penn Apts. Ltd. P’ship, 891 A.2d 291, 303 (D.C. 2006)).
55. Id. at 632 (citing Knippen v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pac.
Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Alex Hofrichter, P.A., 670 So. 2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
56. Athridge, 604 F.3d at 632.
57. Id.
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plained, contra proferentem does not require courts to engage in
forced constructions of policy language to create coverage.58  The
Athridges’ reading of the Aetna policy, which would permit “a supple-
mentary payments provision to manufacture primary liability where
none otherwise exist[ed],” was “the epitome of such a forced construc-
tion.”59  The court refused to go along.60
After dispatching two other issues related to the conduct of the
trial, the Athridge court upheld the jury verdict for Aetna and af-
firmed the district court’s judgment.61
The court in State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Mintarsih62
reached a similar conclusion. Mintarsih arose out of Mimin Mintar-
sih’s lawsuit against State Farm’s insureds, the Lams, for imprisoning
her in their home and enslaving her.63  The Lams tendered Mintarsih’s
lawsuit to State Farm under their homeowners and umbrella policies,
and State Farm agreed to defend them under a reservation of rights.64
The case went to a jury on counts for false imprisonment, fraud, negli-
gence, negligence per se, and wage and hour violations under the Cali-
fornia Labor Code.65  The jury found for Mintarsih on all counts and
awarded her approximately $750,000 in damages.66  As the prevailing
party, Mintarsih also received over $733,000 in attorneys’ fees as costs
under the Labor Code, and over $161,000 in other costs.67
State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action against Mintarsih
and the Lams.68  State Farm contended that the conduct for which the
Lams were held liable was not an accident within the meaning of its
policies and therefore was not covered.69  It further argued that the
award for attorneys’ fees was based on wage and hour claims that its
policies did not cover, and thus those fees were not costs payable
under the supplementary payments provisions in its policies.70  The
trial court held that State Farm’s policies covered $87,000 in damages
assessed against the Lams for false imprisonment and negligence, and
that State Farm had to pay the approximately $161,000 in costs
58. Id. (quoting Cameron v. USAA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 733 A.2d 965, 968 (D.C. 1999)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 635.
62. 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845 (Ct. App. 2009).
63. Id. at 850.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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awarded against the Lams.71  Both Mintarsih and State Farm
appealed.72
On appeal, Mintarsih argued that regardless of coverage, the sup-
plementary payments provisions in the State Farm policies (1) re-
quired State Farm to pay the costs awarded against the Lams,
including attorneys’ fees; and (2) bound State Farm to pay interest on
the entire judgment until it paid the policy limits.73  Under the home-
owners policy, State Farm agreed to pay “‘expenses we incur and costs
taxed against an Insured in suits we defend.’”74  Under the umbrella
policy, it agreed to pay “‘the expenses we incur and costs taxed
against you in suits we defend,’” provided that the suit was not cov-
ered by any other insurance policy.75  The court observed that this
language made State Farm’s obligation to pay costs awarded against
an insured dependent on its duty to defend.76  The court also noted
that “costs,” as used in a supplementary payments provision, was gen-
erally interpreted consistently with the use of that term in California
Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(10), which establishes that a pre-
vailing party may recover as costs attorneys’ fees authorized by con-
tract, statute, or law under another section of the Code.77
The Mintarsih court explained that in an earlier case, Golden Eagle
Insurance Corp. v. Cen-Fed, Ltd.,78 it had “rejected a literal interpre-
tation” of the phrase “any ‘suit’ against an insured we defend,” and
concluded that an insurer had to pay costs taxed against an insured
only if it owed a duty to defend the insured.79  As the court further
explained the holding in Golden Eagle:
We stated that just as an insured could not reasonably expect an
insurer to pay defense costs for a suit in which there was no poten-
tial for coverage, an insured could not reasonably expect an insurer
to pay costs awarded against the insured in such a suit. We also
stated that requiring an insurer to pay costs awarded against an in-
sured only if the insurer defended the action would discourage in-
surers from providing a defense . . . where coverage was in doubt,
contrary to the principle that the law should encourage insurers to
provide a defense in such cases. Accordingly, we held that because
no duty to defend ever arose, the insurer had no obligation to pay
71. Id. at 851.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 853 (quoting the State Farm homeowners policy).
75. Id. (quoting the State Farm umbrella policy).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279 (Ct. App. 2007).
79. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 854 (citing Golden Eagle, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 293).
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costs awarded against the insured, including attorney fees awarded
as costs.80
Therefore, under a supplementary payments provision like those at
issue here, an insurance company must pay costs assessed against an
insured only if it had a duty to defend.81  The court reasoned that this
was what the parties intended in referring to “suits we defend” be-
cause they expected that the insurer would defend a lawsuit only if it
had a duty to do so.82  Of course, an insurer’s duty to defend extends
only to claims that its policy at least potentially covers.83  An insurer
has no duty to defend the insured against claims that are not even
potentially covered under its policy.84
An insurer’s duty to defend an entire “mixed action”—that is, a
case in which some claims are potentially covered and others are
not85—will not support a duty to pay costs awarded against the in-
sured that can be attributed solely to claims the policy did not poten-
tially cover.86  The duty to defend uncovered claims in a mixed action
is implied as a matter of law rather than a contractual dictate, and a
supplementary payments provision’s reference to “suits we defend”
envelopes only claims that the insurer contractually agreed to de-
fend.87  An insured cannot reasonably expect an insurer to pay costs,
including attorneys’ fees, tied solely to claims that its policy did not
even potentially cover.88
Mintarsih conceded that the State Farm policies did not even poten-
tially cover her wage and hour claims.89  Because her entitlement to
attorneys’ fees as costs rested solely on those claims, she could not
recover those fees from State Farm.90
After resolving Mintarsih’s attorneys’ fees claim, the court con-
cluded that under the California Insurance Code, State Farm need not
indemnify the Lams for Mintarsih’s false imprisonment and negli-
80. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
81. Id. (citing Golden Eagle, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 293).
82. Id. at 854–55.
83. Id. at 855.
84. Id. (citing Buss v. Super. Ct., 939 P.2d 766, 776 (Cal. 1997)).
85. See Gonzalez v. Fire Ins. Exch., 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 403 (Ct. App. 2015) (“When a
complaint states multiple claims, some of which are potentially covered by the insurance policy
and some of which are not, it is a mixed action.”); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Weitzel, 371 P.3d 457, 461
(Mont. 2016) (“If a complaint states multiple claims, some of which are covered by the insurance
policy and some of which are not, it is a mixed action.”).
86. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 856.
90. Id.
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gence claims.91  In sum, the State Farm policies covered none of
Mintarsih’s claims in the underlying action.92  This conclusion doomed
her effort to recover post-judgment interest.93
The supplementary payments provision in the Lams’ homeowners
policy stated that State Farm would “pay ‘interest on the entire judg-
ment which accrues after entry of the judgment and before we pay or
tender, or deposit in court that part of the judgment which does not
exceed the limit of liability that applies.’”94  The umbrella policy
terms were nearly identical.95  According to the court, “these provi-
sions contemplate[d] a covered claim and were necessarily tied to and
depend[ed] upon State Farm’s indemnity obligation.”96  State Farm
promised to pay post-judgment interest that accrued before it paid or
tendered the amount payable under each policy, up to the applicable
liability limit.97  The policies’ liability limits applied to their personal
liability coverages—not to supplementary payments.98  By linking the
duty to pay post-judgment interest to the failure to indemnify the in-
sured for a covered claim rather than the failure to pay other amounts
due under the policies, the supplementary payments provisions estab-
lished that State Farm’s post-judgment interest obligation arose only if
its policies covered the damages awarded against the Lams.99  Because
they did not, no obligation to pay post-judgment interest ever arose.100
B. Disconnecting Supplementary Payments from Coverage
A few courts depart from the reasoning of Athridge, Mintarsih, and
Golden Eagle.  Florida courts reason that an insurer’s promise to pay
“costs taxed against an ‘insured’ in any suit we defend”101 and similar
supplementary payments language commits the insurer to pay costs
taxed against the insured regardless of whether the policy covers the
91. Id. at 856–57.
92. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 858.
93. Id. at 857–58.
94. Id. (quoting the policy).
95. Id. at 858.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 858.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners–3 Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 20 (2010).
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causes of action or claims to which the costs relate.102  As the court in
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Alex Hofrichter, P.A.103 explained:
[W]e need go no further than the clear language of the insurance
policy to conclude that in light of the insurer’s undertaking of [the
insured’s] defense, it was obligated to pay the cost judgment which
followed.  This court has already held that the supplementary pay-
ments provision of a policy applies independent of whether or not
there is coverage.  The policy at issue contains no restrictions or lim-
itations on that promise. . . . Once [the insurer] defended, substan-
tive coverage was not necessary to trigger the obligation to pay costs
taxed against the insured in any suit.104
In Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Donnelly,105 the Idaho Su-
preme Court held that the insurer, EMC, was obligated to pay more
than $296,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs awarded against its insured,
RCI, even though EMC had no duty to indemnify RCI.106  The policy
stated that EMC would pay “with respect to any . . . ‘suit’ against an
insured we defend . . . all expenses we incur . . . [and] all costs taxed
against the insured in the suit.’”107  The policy defined a “suit” as a
“civil proceeding in which damages . . . to which this insurance applies
are alleged.”108  The court reasoned that EMC’s obligation to pay
costs was tied to its duty to defend, which arose when the plaintiffs
alleged the existence of covered damages.109  Because EMC’s policy
required only that damages be alleged to trigger its duty to defend
rather than proven, EMC was obligated to pay the costs and attor-
neys’ fees despite owing no duty to indemnify RCI.110
A dissenting Justice argued that while the case was complicated by
the fact that the underlying suit against RCI was a mixed action, the
absence of coverage prevented an award of fees and costs.111  In
particular:
Once there was a final determination that [the plaintiffs] failed to
recover on any “covered claims,” the duty to defend ceased, as did
102. See, e.g., Arnett v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 8:08-CV-2373-T-27EAJ, 2010 WL
2821981, at *12 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2010) (“Having defended the action, the policies require [the
insurers] to pay the judgment for costs and the cost of the attachment bond, regardless of
whether the claims are or are not ultimately covered.”); Tri-State Ins. Co. of Minn. v. Fitzgerald,
593 So. 2d 1118, 1119–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (relying on “the familiar rules of interpreta-
tion applicable to insurance policies”).
103. 670 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
104. Id. at 1025 (citations omitted).
105. 300 P.3d 31 (Idaho 2013).
106. Id. at 35.
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 40 (Eismann, J., specially concurring).
109. Id. at 35.
110. Id.
111. Donnelly, 300 P.3d at 40–43 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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any claim by RCI for indemnity, either for damages or for costs and
fees . . . . The eventual determination that there were no covered
damages necessarily means that there never were any covered
claims.  This fact was merely not determined until the end of the
underlying action. . . .
Most importantly, the policy itself establishes that there is no cover-
age for costs and attorney’s fees in cases in which no covered dam-
ages are awarded against the insured. . . .
. . . .
The term “suit” is . . . defined as “a civil proceeding in which
damages because of ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage’ or ‘personal
advertising injury’ to which this insurance applies are alleged.” . . .
[I]t does not say a suit is a civil proceeding in which damage from
bodily injury or property damage is alleged, but only damages from
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies is
alleged.  It is beyond question that the insurance did not apply to
this suit because there were no damages awarded that were covered
. . . . It is incomprehensible how “supplementary payments” . . .
could apply when there is no coverage . . . . Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “supplemental” as “that which is added to a thing . . . to
complete it.”  What can be “added” to a coverage that does not
exist?112
The dissent contended that the case would be better decided in accor-
dance with the holding in Mintarsih.113
C. Summary and Synthesis
As is so often the case in insurance, the language of the policy at
issue is critical to the outcome in supplementary payments disputes
where the insurer has no duty to indemnify the insured for any judg-
ment awarded against it.114  As a rule, though, an insurer should have
no duty to pay interest on a judgment against an insured in a case the
insurer defends absent a duty to indemnify the insured.115  To hold
otherwise would force the insurer to indemnify the insured for an un-
covered occurrence, since only by paying its full policy limits could an
insurer avoid liability potentially far exceeding those limits.116  In
112. Id. at 42 (Jones, J., dissenting) (last alteration in original).
113. Id. at 43 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing and discussing State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Mintar-
sih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 854–56 (Ct. App. 2009)).
114. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01
04 13), at 8 (2012) (stating that the insurer will pay “[a]ll court costs taxed against the insured in
the ‘suit,’” but that such costs “do not include attorneys’ fees or attorneys’ expenses taxed
against the insured”).
115. Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.3d 625, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2010); State Farm Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Mintarsih, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 857–58 (Ct. App. 2009); First Mercury Ins. Co. v.
Nationwide Sec. Servs., Inc.,  2016 IL App (1st) 143924, ¶¶ 38–40; World Harvest Church v.
Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 68 N.E.3d 738, 746–47 (Ohio 2016).
116. Athridge, 604 F.3d at 631.
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other words, such a ruling would have the effect of creating coverage
where none otherwise exists—and contrary to the clear and unambig-
uous language of the policy.117  In addition, to the extent that the in-
surer’s obligation to pay interest on a judgment can be said either to
supplement its duty to indemnify the insured or to be related to its
duty to indemnify the insured,118 it would be anomalous to hold that
the insurer should have to pay interest on a judgment that it has no
duty satisfy.
It is a closer call where the insurer is alleged to have a duty to pay
court costs taxed against the insured.  On the one hand, the insurer’s
duty to defend extends to claims or causes of action that its policy only
potentially covers,119 such that a standard used to gauge its duty to
indemnify should not determine its obligation to pay costs assessed
against the insured.  Moreover, where the defending insurer is con-
trolling the defense, it is arguably fair to require it to bear the costs of
its litigation decisions.
On the other hand, if the policy never covered the claims or causes
of action at issue, the insurer never had a duty to defend them.120  The
fact that a court may not make this determination until after costs are
incurred does not alter this principle.121  For that matter, “providing a
defense is hardly the same as indemnifying the insured for the other
party’s costs and attorney fees that the insured [became] obligated to
pay only as a result of being found liable for the underlying miscon-
duct.”122  Paying an opposing party’s costs is not a necessary aspect of
defending the insured.123  Indeed, because costs are taxed against an
insured after liability is established, an insurer’s obligation to pay
them is more like its duty to indemnify the insured, which pivots on
the existence of coverage.124  But even when viewed in an indemnity
117. See id. (requiring an insurer to pay interest on a judgment in any case it defends would
“effectively render[ ] the policy exclusions that follow the supplementary payment provisions a
dead letter”).
118. Again, an insurer’s obligation to pay interest on judgments in some circumstances is not
part of its duty to indemnify the insured.  A supplementary payments provision does not create
coverage under the policy of which it is a part.  Hargob Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co., 901 N.Y.S.2d 657, 660 (App. Div. 2010).  Coverage under the policy, if any, is created by
the policy’s insuring agreements. Id.
119. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Mktg., L.L.C., 353 P.3d 319, 325 (Cal. 2015); Cox v. Com-
monwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 59 A.3d 1280, 1283 (Me. 2013); see also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV
Transp., 115 P.3d 460, 466 (Cal. 2005) (explaining what is meant by “a potential for coverage” or
“a potential for indemnity”).
120. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. v. Cen-Fed, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 292 (Ct. App. 2007).
121. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Donnelly, 300 P.3d 31, 42 (Idaho 2013) (Jones, J., dissenting).
122. Combs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917, 923 (Ct. App. 2006).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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light, holding that an insurer must pay a plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees as
supplementary payments is dubious given that the insurer promised to
indemnify the insured against covered damages, and attorneys’ fees
awarded to a prevailing party are not necessarily “damages” for liabil-
ity insurance purposes.125
An insurer’s control of the defense ought not determine its obliga-
tion to pay costs in the absence of a duty to indemnify because in
defending the insured under a reservation of rights, the insurer is no
volunteer.  The insurer is defending the litigation because the insured
tendered the matter to it.  Once involved, the insurer must defend the
case responsibly.126  Furthermore, a defending insurer has limited con-
trol over the course of the litigation and thus the associated costs; the
plaintiff has at least equal and perhaps greater ability to call the tune.
Finally, there is also some danger that requiring an insurer to as-
sume liability for costs in the absence of a duty to indemnify may dis-
courage insurers from agreeing to defend insureds where coverage is
doubtful.127  Fortunately, this risk is substantially lessened where the
insurer’s supplementary payments provision expressly disclaims the
obligation to pay an opposing party’s attorneys’ fees as costs.128  Ex-
traordinary cost awards usually include the opponent’s attorneys’ fees
as an element.
On balance, the majority rule that an insurer has no duty under a
supplementary payments provision to pay costs assessed against an
insured in a case in which it has no duty to indemnify the insured is
sound.  Where it is feasible to allocate costs between covered and un-
covered claims or causes of action, however, the insurer should have
to pay costs tied to covered claims or causes of action.  A court en-
gaged in this exercise must respect the plain and unambiguous lan-
guage of the insurance policy at issue.  If the policy clearly excludes
125. See, e.g., Cutler-Orosi Unified Sch. Dist. v. Tulare Cty. Sch. Dists. Liab./Prop. Self Ins.
Auth., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 114–15 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing fees awarded under the federal
Voting Rights Act).
126. See Douglas R. Richmond, Reconnoitering Reservations of Rights, 51 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 33 (2015) (explaining that an insurance company defending under a reservation of
rights must “defend the insured reasonably, responsibly, and in good faith”); see also Cleaver-
Brooks, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 865 N.W.2d 105, 116 (Neb. 2015) (“When a claim arises,
an insurer generally owes a duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care in defending the
suit.” (footnote omitted)).
127. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. v. Cen-Fed, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 292 (Ct. App. 2007).
128. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01
04 13), at 8 (2012) (stating that court costs taxed against the insured “do not include attorneys’
fees or attorneys’ expenses taxed against the insured”).
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from payable costs attorneys’ fees or expenses taxed against the in-
sured,129 the court must enforce that language as written.130
III. PROPERLY INTERPRETING AN INSURER’S OBLIGATION TO PAY
AN INSURED’S EXPENSES INCURRED AT THE INSURER’S “REQUEST”
Insurers’ payment of interest or courts costs when coverage is de-
batable is but one of several recurring points of dispute under supple-
mentary payments provisions keyed to insurers’ payment of litigation
related expenses.  Declaratory judgment actions and other coverage
litigation between insureds and insurers also spawn supplementary
payment questions.
To lay some foundation, a supplementary payments provision typi-
cally states that the insurer will pay costs or expenses incurred by the
insured at the insurer’s “request.”131  It is easy to imagine such costs.
In a product liability case against a manufacturer of a tool or piece of
machinery, the defense lawyer may want to obtain an identical item
for testing by an engineering expert.  The defense lawyer’s request for
the exemplar constitutes a request by the insurer,132 and the manufac-
turer deserves to be reimbursed for the cost of the item.  In a case
where someone is injured on the insured’s property, the insurer may
ask the insured to document or preserve the accident scene.  The in-
sured is entitled to be reimbursed for the reasonable cost of its efforts.
In most cases, any expenses an insurer asks an insured to incur are
modest, and insureds rarely seek reimbursement.133  Regardless, the
key is that the insurer’s request is tied to its defense or investigation of
a third party’s claim or suit against the insured.  Only then should the
insurer have to make a supplementary payment.  This should be a
straightforward proposition.
129. Id.
130. See Haering v. Topa Ins. Co., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 291, 294 (Ct. App. 2016) (“If the language
of the policy is clear and explicit, it governs.”); Travelers Prop. & Cas. Co. of Am. v. Stresscon
Corp., 370 P.3d 140, 143 (Colo. 2016) (explaining that an unambiguous insurance policy must be
enforced as written).
131. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners–3 Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 21
(2010) (stating that the insurer will pay “[r]easonable expenses incurred by an ‘insured’ at our
request, including actual loss of earnings (but not loss of other income) up to $250 per day, for
assisting us in the investigation or defense of a claim or suit”); ISO Props., Inc., Personal Auto
Policy (PP 00 01 05), at 2–3 (2003) (“We will pay on behalf of an ‘insured’ . . . [o]ther reasonable
expenses incurred at our request.”).
132. Bethlehem Constr., Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., No. CV-03-0324-EFS, 2007 WL 666629, at *8
(E.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2007); Quinn & Seelig, supra note 21, at 135. R
133. Quinn & Seelig, supra note 21, at 135. R
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Unfortunately, some courts expand the meaning of “request” be-
yond all reason.  In New Hampshire Indemnity Co. v. Gray,134 for ex-
ample, a Florida court determined that the supplementary payments
provision in the New Hampshire Indemnity Co. (NHIC) policy, which
stated that NHIC would pay, in addition to its policy limits, “[o]ther
reasonable expenses incurred at [its] request,”135 required it to pay
more than $135,000 in costs assessed against its insured, Damil Be-
lizaire, following a verdict against him.136  As the court explained:
[U]nder insurance policies such as the one here, insurers enjoy the
sole right to settle or litigate claims against their insureds; therefore,
choosing to litigate is no different than a request or “expressing a
desire” to do so.  Any such expression, or request, necessarily en-
compasses incurring litigation costs, which may mean not only the
insurer’s litigation costs, but also those incurred by the opposing
party should that party prevail. It is the insurer’s choice to litigate—
a decision only it can make—that results in these costs being in-
curred; thus, “those expenses [are] incurred at the insurer’s
request.”137
The Gray court got it wrong.  NHIC did not “choos[e] to litigate”
on Belizaire’s behalf; it defended him when he was sued by the plain-
tiff, John Gray.138  It was Gray who chose to litigate—not NHIC.
NHIC could neither refuse to defend Belizaire nor do so apathetically
and thereby reduce any costs that might be awarded against him if
Gray prevailed,139 nor could it prevent Gray’s lawyers from undertak-
ing expensive activities in pursuing his case.  While NHIC might have
settled with Gray before he filed suit or soon thereafter, nothing in the
opinion indicates that NHIC had the opportunity to do so.  To the
contrary, the size of the verdict against Belizaire—$2.3 million—and
Gray’s catastrophic injury suggest that NHIC never could have settled
the case for the clearly inadequate liability limits of its policy.140
134. 177 So. 3d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
135. Id. at 61.
136. Id. at 58–59.
137. Id. at 63 (quoting Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc. v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995)).
138. Id. at 61.
139. See Cleaver-Brooks, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 865 N.W.2d 105, 116 (Neb. 2015)
(“When a claim arises, an insurer generally owes a duty to the insured to exercise reasonable
care in defending the suit.” (footnote omitted)); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 5, at 818 (“An R
insurer undertaking to defend the insured must perform with due care.” (footnote omitted)).
140. See Gray, 177 So. 3d at 58 (stating the verdict amount and calling Gray’s injury
“catastrophic”).
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More fundamentally, even if “request” could be assigned the mean-
ing the Gray court gave it, which is doubtful,141 in doing so the court
violated the cardinal rule of contract construction that policy terms
must be read in context.142  Nothing about the context in which the
word was used in the NHIC policy implied an obligation to pay costs
taxed to Belizaire.  By interpreting the term “request” as it did, the
Gray court effectively rewrote the NHIC policy, which it was not em-
powered to do.143
Finally, even if NHIC negligently defended Gray’s lawsuit or other-
wise failed to protect Belizaire against liability for the disputed costs,
the answer was not to torture the NHIC policy until it revealed an
obligation to pay.144  Rather, the solution was for Belizaire to sue
NHIC for breach of contract, negligence, or bad faith, or for Gray to
do so as his assignee.
Other courts employ even more dubious reasoning in connection
with insurers’ declaratory judgment actions against policyholders.
These courts hold that an insurer that files a declaratory judgment
action against its insured and is held to owe coverage must pay the
successful insured’s attorneys’ fees incurred in defending that litiga-
tion because the insurer’s suit was a “request” that the insured incur
those fees.145 Upland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Noel146 figures promi-
nently in this line of authority.
141. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1482 (4th ed.
2009) (defining “request” as to “express a desire for; ask for,” to “ask (a person) to do some-
thing,” “[t]he act of asking,” or “[s]omething asked for”).
142. Ritrama, Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 796 F.3d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 2015); Hartford
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distrib., Inc., 326 P.3d 253, 259 (Cal. 2014) (quoting Bank of the W. v.
Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992)); CT Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 9
N.Y.S.3d 220, 224 (App. Div. 2015).
143. Zeller v. AAA Ins. Co., 40 N.E.3d 958, 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“The power to interpret
insurance policies does not extend to changing their terms.” (quoting Keckler v. Meridian Sec.
Ins. Co., 967 N.E.2d 18, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012))).
144. See Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637
(D.S.C. 2006) (stating that courts should not torture insurance policy language to extend cover-
age the parties never intended).
145. See, e.g., Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Val Pro, Inc., Case No. 12-CV-1658 (JNE/JJK), 2013
WL 6388669, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2013) (applying Minnesota law); Sentry Select Ins. Co. v.
Meyer, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198–99 (D. Nev. 2009) (involving insureds who were not sued in
the underlying tort action); Great W. Cas. Co. v. See, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 (D. Nev. 2002)
(citing Upland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noel, 519 P.2d 737, 743 (Kan. 1974)); Olympic S.S. Co. v. Centen-
nial Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 673, 681 (Wash. 1991)); Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. McGuire, 173 F. Supp. 2d
1107, 1116 (D. Kan. 2001) (applying Kansas law); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cook, 435 P.2d
364, 368 (Idaho 1967) (stating that the insurer could not escape its obligation “on the ground that
the action [was] for declaratory relief, when the effect upon the insured [was] as burdensome in
its consequences as any other type of legal action”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sigman, 508
N.W.2d 323, 325–26 (N.D. 1993) (finding the supplementary payments provision ambiguous); see
also Flannery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232–33 (D. Colo. 1999) (reasoning that
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL301.txt unknown Seq: 22 30-AUG-17 12:41
784 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:763
Noel was a declaratory judgment action by Upland Mutual against
its insureds, Raymond and Viola Noel, to determine whether Upland
Mutual had a duty to defend and indemnify them under a homeown-
ers insurance policy.147  The underlying case arose out of an accident
in which two cars driven by the Noels’ sons collided, killing both
young men and one of their passengers, and injuring another passen-
ger.148  The Noels had sought coverage for the plaintiffs’ claim that
Raymond Noel negligently entrusted his car to his son, Steven.149
The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that Upland Mutual had a
duty to defend the Noels in the underlying litigation.150  The Noel
court also held that because Upland Mutual had a duty to defend the
Noels, the Noels were entitled to recover from Upland Mutual their
attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in defending the underlying
case.151  The court then went further to hold that the Noels could re-
cover their attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred defending the de-
claratory judgment action.152  In so holding, the Noel court agreed
with the trial court that this result flowed from the supplementary
payments provision in the Upland Mutual policy, which stated, “With
respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy . . . this Com-
pany shall pay, in addition to the applicable limits of liability: . . .  (d)
all reasonable expense, other than loss of earnings, incurred by the
insured at this Company’s request.”153  The court reasoned that “the
filing of this suit constituted a ‘request’ by Upland and therefore the
company [was] obligated under its policy to reimburse the . . . Noels
for all reasonable expenses incurred at the company’s request.”154
The result might well have been different had the Upland Mutual
policy stated that Upland Mutual would pay the insureds’ reasonable
expenses with respect to any claim or suit it defended, thus explicitly
confining its obligation to expenses incurred in the underlying ac-
the insured could recover his fees in a declaratory judgment action he filed because the carrier’s
delay in suing that allowed him to win the race to the courthouse was equivalent to initiating
litigation, and thus constituted a request that he incur attorneys’ fees); Olympic S.S. Co. v.
Centennial Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 673, 680–81 (Wash. 1991) (involving a successful declaratory judg-
ment action filed by the insured).
146. 519 P.2d 737 (Kan. 1974).
147. Id. at 738.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 738–39.
150. Id. at 741.
151. Id. at 742.
152. Noel, 519 P.2d at 742.
153. Id. at 739.
154. Id. at 743.
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tion.155  Insurers do themselves a substantial favor by expressly stating
that they will pay an insured’s reasonable expenses only in connection
with a claim or suit the insurer defends, and by further explicitly limit-
ing the obligation to reasonable expenses incurred by the insured to
assist in the defense or investigation of that claim or suit.156  For in-
stance, a standard CGL policy states:
[The insurance company] will pay, with respect to any claim we in-
vestigate or settle, or any “suit” against an insured we defend:
. . . .
d. All reasonable expenses incurred by the insured at our request
to assist us in the investigation or defense of the claim or “suit”,
including actual loss of earnings up to $250 a day because of
time off from work.157
To interpret that clause as requiring the insurer to pay the insured’s
attorneys’ fees and costs in a declaratory judgment action would be
absurd.158  Even without such a limitation, however, the Noel court
erred by interpreting the Upland Mutual policy as it did.159
An insurer’s pursuit of a declaratory judgment action is not a “re-
quest” that the insured incur attorneys’ fees and expenses.160  Indeed,
the insurer is requesting nothing of the insured; rather, it is asking the
court to determine its contractual obligations to the insured.  The in-
surer would be delighted if the insured did not contest the declaratory
judgment action.  Even if a court were to reason that the term “re-
155. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Charity, 871 F. Supp. 1401, 1403–04 (D. Kan. 1994)
(differentiating between one supplementary payments provision that did not tie the insurer’s
obligation to pay expenses to its defense of the insured and a supplementary payments provision
in another insurer’s policy that did, and holding that the first insurer had to pay the insured’s
attorneys’ fees and expenses in the declaratory judgment action, but the second insurer did not).
156. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 2:13-cv-852-LDG-PAL, 2015
WL 5731904, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he plain and unambiguous reading of this provi-
sion requires that any expenses . . . would be paid by Liberty Mutual only if they are ‘incurred by
the insured at [Liberty Mutual’s] request to assist [Liberty Mutual] in the investigation or de-
fense of the claim or “suit”.’  The facts do not indicate that Liberty Mutual requested defendants
to assist it in the investigation or defense of a claim or suit.”); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 871 F.
Supp. at 1403–04 (concluding that a policy containing such language did not obligate the insurer
to pay the insured’s attorneys’ fees and expenses in a declaratory judgment action).
157. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13),
at 8–9 (2012).
158. See, e.g., Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Heritage Estates Mut. Hous. Ass’n, Inc., 77 P.3d 911, 914
(Colo. Ct. App. 2003) (involving a declaratory judgment action filed by the insurer in which the
insured counterclaimed; the insured argued that the insurer had to pay its fees and costs for
defending the declaratory judgment action and for prosecuting its counterclaims, which the court
characterized in the former instance as “at best” a “strained construction” of the supplementary
payments provision, and in the latter instance as an “absurd interpretation” of the policy).
159. See 2 WINDT, supra note 2, § 8:14, at 8-43 (branding the policy interpretation in Noel and R
other cases taking the same approach “manifestly unreasonable”).
160. Green v. Allstate Ins. Co., Case No. 3:11-cv-00210-TMB, 2015 WL 10939709, at *10 (D.
Alaska Mar. 26, 2015).
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quest” was unclear or uncertain when read in isolation,161 that conclu-
sion would not automatically render it ambiguous and thus justify its
construction against the insurer.162  When interpreting an insurance
policy, a court’s task “is not only to examine the words in controversy
but to examine them in light of the policy as a whole.”163  When read-
ing these clauses in the context of the supplementary payments provi-
sion as a whole, it is clear that an insurer that litigates coverage with
its insured is not requesting the insured to incur attorneys’ fees and
expenses for the insurer to pay if the insured prevails.  The fact that
the insurer might have included additional clarifying language in its
supplementary payments provision does not render the policy
ambiguous.164
Fortunately, most courts hold that an insurer that litigates coverage
with its insured does not thereby request that the insured incur rea-
sonable fees and costs that the insurer must pay if the insured
prevails.165  This line of authority traces back over sixty years to the
161. See, e.g., M-B Co. v. Parker Hannafin Corp., 447 N.W.2d 394, 1989 WL 111968, at *3
(Wis. Ct. App. July 12, 1989) (unpublished table decision) (applying Ohio law and reading policy
language in isolation).
162. Bartkowiak v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2015 IL App (1st) 133549, ¶¶ 32–35, 39
N.E.3d 176, 184.
163. Id.
164. Just v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n, 877 N.W.2d 467, 479 (Iowa 2016).
165. See, e.g., Green, 2015 WL 10939709, at *10–11 (predicting how the Alaska Supreme
Court would rule); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 2:13-cv-852-LDG-PAL, 2015
WL 5731904, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he plain and unambiguous reading of this provi-
sion requires that any expenses . . . would be paid by Liberty Mutual only if they are ‘incurred by
the insured at [Liberty Mutual’s] request to assist [Liberty Mutual] in the investigation or de-
fense of the claim or ‘suit’.  The facts do not indicate that Liberty Mutual requested defendants
to assist it in the investigation or defense of a claim or suit.”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Teamcorp., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090–91 (D. Colo. 2011) (applying Colorado law); Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co. v. Capella Grp., Inc., No. 4:09-CV-295-A, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118669, at *17–19 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2009) (applying Texas law); Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Arena Grp. 2000, L.P., No. 05-CV-1435 JLS (CAB), 2008 WL 696932, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
13, 2008) (applying California law); Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Epstein, No. Civ.A.03-6506, 2004 WL
2075038, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2004) (applying Pennsylvania law and noting that because
the insurer was not defending the insured in the declaratory judgment action, the supplementary
payments provision did not apply); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Black & Decker Corp., 383 F. Supp.
2d 200, 222 (D. Mass. 2004) (predicting Massachusetts law); Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire
& Cas. Co., 916 F. Supp. 923, 933 (D. Minn. 1995) (interpreting Minnesota law); Cont’l Cas. Co.
v. Cole, No. 79-1849, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15836, at *20–25 (D.D.C. June 15, 1984) (explaining
that the policy linked supplementary payments to the defense of a third-party action against the
insured); Clark v. Exch. Ins. Ass’n, 161 So. 2d 817, 819 (Ala. 1964) (concluding that a provision
stating the insurer would reimburse the insured for “all reasonable expenses . . . incurred at the
company’s request” did not entitle the insured to recover its fees in a declaratory judgment
action); Carroll v. Hanover Ins. Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 868, 871 (Ct. App. 1968) (deciding that the
insured’s urged policy interpretation was unreasonable); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Huizar, 52 P.3d 816,
819 (Colo. 2002) (“[T]he . . . insurance policy . . . cannot be reasonably construed to obligate the
insurer to defend the insured against a claim of the insurer itself, much less to pay the insured’s
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Fifth Circuit’s seminal decision in Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance Co.
v. Davis.166
The supplementary payments provision embedded in the insuring
agreements in the policy in Milwaukee Mechanics included this clause:
“The Company shall reimburse the insured for all reasonable ex-
penses, other than loss of earnings, incurred at the Company’s re-
quest.”167  The insured argued that this language required the insurer
to pay the insured’s attorneys’ fees incurred in the parties’ declaratory
judgment action as well as those incurred defending the underlying
tort action, and the district court agreed.168  The Fifth Circuit did not:
To say that a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, or for that
matter in any law suit, “requests” the defendant to employ attor-
neys to contest the action, is a mere play upon words and is contrary
to the real substance of the transaction.  Due process would, of
course, accord the insured the privilege of resisting the company’s
claim of non-liability and to that end the insured would have the
right to employ attorneys, but it would be contrary to every interest
of the company to say that the company “requested” such action.
We do not think that either the insurance company or the insured
could have had the intention that the insurance company could de-
fend a suit on its policy or could file a declaratory judgment action
only at the risk of being liable for attorney’s fees incurred by the
insured.  In our opinion, the attorney’s fees incurred by the insured
legal expenses to challenge the validity of the . . . the contract. It is clear . . . that the insurer’s
obligation to defend extends only to suits by third parties with claims against the insured per-
son.”); Buell Indus., Inc. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., No. X04CV 980116309S, 1999 WL
566969, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 1999); Nat’l Union v. Rhone Poulenc, No. 87C-09-11,
1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 107, at *6–7 & n.1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1995) (“What the insured has con-
tracted for . . . is freedom from tort liability, not freedom from the burden of litigating a contract
action.  The burden of coverage litigation has not been contractually transferred from the in-
sured to the insurer . . . .”); Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc. v. All the Way With Bill Vernay, Inc., 864
So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting and citing Steele v. Kinsey, 801 So. 2d 297,
299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)) (stating that an insurer’s obligation is to pay only those expenses
that it expressly authorized, and thus that its supplementary payments obligation does not ex-
tend to a declaratory judgment action); Int’l Ins. Co. v. Rollprint Pkg. Prods., Inc., 728 N.E.2d
680, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing Duke Univ. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 384 S.E.2d 36, 46
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989)); Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Inhabitants of the Town of Topsham, 441 A.2d
1012, 1018–19 (Me. 1982); Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 991 P.2d 638, 648 (Wash. Ct.
Ap. 1999); Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. v. Rees, 617 P.2d 747, 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (adopting
the reasoning of a seminal Fifth Circuit decision); see also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d
987, 993 (Idaho 1980) (stating that the insurer’s duty to defend the insured did not require the
insurer to pay the insured’s attorneys’ fees in a declaratory judgment action); Mikel v. Am.
Ambassador Cas. Co., 644 N.E.2d 168, 171 & n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that the insurer
could not have requested that the insured incur fees and expenses where the insured filed the
declaratory judgment action, but not deciding whether the result would be different where the
insurer initiated the litigation).
166. 198 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1952).
167. Id. at 444 (quoting the insurance policy).
168. Id.
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in the declaratory judgment action were not recoverable from the
insurance company.169
The Milwaukee Mechanics court corrected the judgment to elimi-
nate the attorneys’ fees awarded to the insured for defending the de-
claratory judgment action.170  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment
in all other respects.171
The majority approach is unquestionably correct.  If an insured that
prevails in litigation with its insurer is entitled to recover its reasona-
ble attorneys’ fees, any fee award must be based on a statute or ad-
ministrative regulation,172 or rest on a common law exception to the
American Rule.173  A supplementary payments provision is no basis
for awarding an insured its attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in
connection with a declaratory judgment action, regardless of who ini-
tiated the litigation.
An unusual Nevada federal case, Sentry Select Insurance Co. v.
Meyer,174 in which the court acknowledged the majority rule but devi-
ated from it, offers no reason to reject the majority rule or to pick and
choose when to apply it. Meyer has no precedential value
regardless.175
In Meyer, Michael Thieman, who was driving a tractor-trailer that
he leased from Dean and Billie Meyer, hit a motorcycle driven by
Lance Otterstein.176  Otterstein sued Thieman, but did not sue the
Meyers.177
Thieman tendered his defense in Otterstein’s suit to Sentry Select
Insurance Co. (Sentry), which had issued a truckers liability policy to
169. Id. at 445.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.428(1) (2016) (“Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by
any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or
the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court or, in
the event of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court shall
adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum
as fees or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the suit in which
the recovery is had.”); TEX. INS. CODE § 541.152(a)(1) (2011) (providing for the award of “court
costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees” in addition to actual damages in an action
alleging an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business
of insurance).
173. See 2 WINDT, supra note 2, § 8:14, at 8-36 to -40 (discussing attorneys’ fee awards to R
insureds who prevail over insurers in declaratory judgment actions).
174. 594 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Nev. 2009).
175. See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass.
2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately observed, with char-
acteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative nor precedential.”).
176. Meyer, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
177. Id. at 1194–95.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-3\DPL301.txt unknown Seq: 27 30-AUG-17 12:41
2017] SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS PROVISION 789
Dean Meyer.178  The Meyers stayed out of the matter.179  Sentry de-
nied that its policy covered the tractor-trailer and then filed a declara-
tory judgment action in which it named Thieman and the Meyers as
defendants.180  Oddly, despite naming the Meyers as defendants, Sen-
try sought no relief concerning them.181
The Meyers incurred around $20,000 in attorneys’ fees defending
the declaratory judgment action and sought reimbursement under the
supplementary payments provision in the Sentry policy, which stated
that Sentry would “pay for the ‘insured’. . . [a]ll reasonable expenses
incurred by the ‘insured’ at [Sentry’s] request.”182  While recognizing
that the Meyers’ claim contradicted the majority rule discussed above,
the court agreed that the Meyers had incurred their defense costs at
Sentry’s request:
In [the] cases [articulating the majority rule], the insureds sought
and were denied coverage by their insurers.  After obtaining judg-
ments establishing that their insurers should have defended them,
the insureds became parties to separate actions in which they sought
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in obtaining those judg-
ments.  Here, in contrast, the insureds never sought . . . coverage for
any party or enforcement of any right (besides a contractual right to
attorney fees addressed here).  Neither, apparently, had any party
claimed entitlement to recovery against them in the underlying ac-
tion . . . .  Sentry likewise [made] no allegation that they breached
the terms of the policy.  The Meyers incurred no defense costs in the
underlying action and were never a party to it, as they apparently
ha[d] no stake in the litigation.  Indeed, the Meyers’ role in the un-
derlying action and accident appear[ed] inconsequential at best. . . .
[T]he Meyers [were] not a necessary party to this action, and their
inclusion here was gratuitous and solely for the benefit of their
insurer.
For this reason . . . Sentry’s decision to name the Meyers as de-
fendants and compel them to defend the suit [was] . . . a “request,”
within the meaning of the policy provision at issue, that the Meyers
participate as parties to this action and incur related attorney
fees.183
If the Meyer court’s frustration with Sentry’s inept pleading or liti-
gation strategy was understandable, its reasoning was not.  As ex-
plained earlier, Sentry requested nothing of the Meyers; it asked the
court to determine its obligations under its policy.  Sentry would have
178. Id. at 1195.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Meyer, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. at 1198–99.
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been happy for the Meyers to sit out the declaratory judgment action.
For that matter, it is a mystery how the Meyers’ lawyer could have
charged $20,000 to defend them.  If the court believed that Sentry
should be made to pay the Meyers’ legal costs as a penalty for base-
lessly suing them or for clumsily pleading its cause of action, it should
have imposed sanctions.  The Meyers perhaps could have sued Sentry
for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, but whatever the
proper remedial approach may have been, the court’s misconstruction
of the supplementary payments provision in the Sentry policy was an
error.
IV. THE INSURER’S OBLIGATION TO PAY PREMIUMS FOR BONDS
A. Appeal or Supersedeas Bonds
While, as we have just seen, litigation between insurers and insureds
gives rise to supplementary payments controversies, most supplemen-
tary payment disputes relate to suits by third parties against insureds.
In light of the frequency of appeals in civil litigation and insurers’ duty
to defend insureds through appeal in some cases, as well as efforts to
collect or secure judgments that are a regular part of litigation, it is no
surprise that insurers’ duties under those portions of their supplemen-
tary payments provisions that concern the costs of bonds are more
than occasionally tested.184
Supplementary payments provisions often state that the insurer will
pay some limited amount for certain bail bonds or for bonds to release
the cost of attachments as long as the bond amount is within the liabil-
ity limits of the policy.185  These provisions do not say that the insurer
will pay the cost of appeal bonds, also known as supersedeas bonds.
Other policies state that the insurer will pay “premiums on bonds re-
quired” in suits the insurer defends but do not expressly identify ap-
peal bonds.186  Still other policies state that the insurer will pay
premiums on appeal bonds in any suit the insurer defends.187  There
is, quite simply, great variation among policies when it comes to ap-
peal or supersedeas bonds.
184. See, e.g., Charter Oak Ins. Co. v. Maglio Fresh Food, 45 F. Supp. 3d 461, 474 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (“The [p]olicy provides for the payment of ‘cost’ of a bond.  The parties do not dispute that
this provision would apply to appellate bonds; however, it remains unclear what the [p]olicy
means by the ‘cost’ of a bond. The Court interprets that term to include whatever amount would
be necessary to secure a bond.”).
185. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01
04 13), at 8 (2012).
186. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners–3 Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 20
(2010).
187. See, e.g., ISO Props., Inc., Personal Auto Policy (PP 00 01 01 05), at 2 (2003).
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If a supplementary payments provision states that the insurer will
pay premiums for appeal bonds, the insurer must do so in accordance
with the policy language.  If the policy further states that the insurer
need not apply for or furnish an appeal bond, then that language will
be effective.188  In that case, an insured that wants to bond an appeal
may need to procure the bond and get reimbursed for the premium by
the insurer.  The insurer does not breach its duty to defend by requir-
ing the insured to follow that procedure rather than initiating or lead-
ing efforts to obtain a bond for the insured.189
What if the policy does not expressly provide for the payment of
premiums for appeal bonds?  A policy’s promise to pay for bonds to
release attachments does not create a duty to pay the premium for an
appeal bond.  These two types of bonds do not secure similar obliga-
tions.190  An appeal or supersedeas bond is not a bond to release an
attachment.191  Bonds to release attachments are posted to allow the
repossession of property that has been seized in a prejudgment pro-
cess, or to clear title to property that has been attached.192  In con-
trast, an appeal or supersedeas bond prevents a judgment creditor
from attempting to collect a judgment by levying on the insured’s as-
sets or garnishing the insured’s accounts or wages pending appeal.193
Courts have required insurers to pay premiums for appeal bonds in
cases where the policies were silent on that obligation.194  In Franklin
v. National General Assurance Co.,195 for example, the court stated
that National General’s “contractual obligations involving the posting
of an appeal bond [fell] within [its] duty to defend its insured.”196  The
Franklin court’s position is consistent with courts’ general view that an
insurer’s duty to defend includes a duty to appeal when there are rea-
sonable grounds for appeal and an appeal would serve the insured’s
188. See, e.g., James River Ins. Co. v. Interlachen Propertyowners Ass’n, No. 14-3434 ADM/
LIB, 2016 WL 3093383, at *5–6 (D. Minn. June 1, 2016) (applying Minnesota law).
189. Id. at *6.
190. Wright, supra note 10, at 61. R
191. Wiegert-Stathes v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. A-08-1041, 2009 WL 3381578, at *6
(Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009).
192. Wright, supra note 10, at 61. R
193. Id.
194. See also Wiegert-Stathes, 2009 WL 3381578, at *7 (“We can envision that posting a super-
sedeas bond . . . could be required as a ‘cost of defense’ [and thus encompassed by a supplemen-
tary payments provision even if not expressly identified] in certain situations.  The obvious
example would be where the appealed judgment is less than the policy limits and the insured
justifiably expects to be protected from levy while the adverse judgment is on appeal.”).
195. No. 2:13-CV-103-WKW, 2013 WL 3854486 (M.D. Ala. July 25, 2013).
196. Id. at *2.
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interests.197  In Merritt v. J.A. Stafford Co.,198 the California Supreme
Court noted that an insurer’s failure to obtain a bond “may result in
the insured losing large amounts of property due to execution sales
during the appeal and thus losing . . . the benefits of the insurance.”199
The Merritt court therefore held that an insurer’s implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing obligates it to file an appeal bond “in an amount
sufficient to cover the part of the judgment for which it is liable.”200
In comparison, other courts have held that an insurer has no duty to
pay for an appeal bond where its policy does not expressly impose that
obligation.  In United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home,
Inc.,201 for example, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court that United Fire did not act in bad faith by appealing on the
insureds’ behalf while declining to post a supersedeas bond to protect
them against possible execution on the judgment against them during
the appeal.202  The Shelly court observed that the policy did not re-
quire United Fire to obtain a bond and the insurer reasonably
doubted its duty to indemnify the insureds.203  Considering United
Fire’s “good-faith doubts about coverage, and the underlying purpose
of the bond to secure the judgment,” the court believed that it was
reasonable for United Fire not to chance assuming liability on the
bond regardless of the result of the appeal.204
Assuming that an insurer must pay the premium for an appeal
bond—whatever the source of that obligation—the question then be-
comes the scope of the insurer’s duty.  If the amount of the judgment
exceeds the policy limits, must the insurer pay for a bond in the full
amount of the judgment, or must it only procure a bond to cover the
portion of the judgment that is within its policy limits?  It appears to
be the majority rule that the insurer need only pay for a bond that
covers that portion of the judgment that is within its policy limits.205
197. See, e.g., Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Haw. 1999) (stat-
ing that an insurer has a duty to appeal only if reasonable grounds exist); Pharmacists Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Myers, 993 A.2d 413, 421 (Vt. 2010) (concluding that the insurer should have appealed in
a mixed action).
198. 440 P.2d 927 (Cal. 1968).
199. Id. at 931.
200. Id.
201. 642 N.W.2d 648 (Iowa 2002).
202. Id. at 658.  The insureds’ personal counsel persuaded the plaintiffs to delay execution on
their judgment until the insureds resolved their coverage dispute with United Fire. Id. at 652.
203. Id. at 658.
204. Id.
205. See Bowen v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 451 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (describing
this as the majority rule); see, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nolen Grp., Inc., Nos. 02-
8601, 03-3192, 03-3651, 2007 WL 4245740, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2007) (interpreting Penn-
sylvania law); Merritt v. J.A. Stafford Co., 440 P.2d 927, 931 (Cal. 1968) (“[T]he insurer cannot
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After all, if the insurer were to purchase a bond for the full amount of
the judgment and the case was affirmed on appeal, the insurer would
be liable on the bond for the entire judgment.206  This would effec-
tively rewrite the policy to increase the liability limits beyond those
for which the insured contracted.207
Wiegert-Stathes v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.208 is in-
structive.  In that case, Erich Wiegert won a $360,000 judgment
against Fretaco, Inc., which was a Taco John’s restaurant franchisee.
Wiegert was one of several customers who contracted hepatitis A as a
result of eating at the restaurant.209  By the time of his judgment,
Fretaco had exhausted all but about $800 of the $500,000 per occur-
rence liability limit of its American Family policy through settlements
with other sick customers.210  Fretaco’s owners understood that the
final settlement that effectively exhausted the policy limits meant that
American Family would have no obligation to post a supersedeas
bond in Wiegert’s case should there be an appeal.211  They nonethe-
less preferred that strategy because, for reasons not relevant here, it
eliminated their personal exposure.212
American Family appealed Wiegert’s judgment on behalf of
Fretaco, but did not post a supersedeas bond.213  The judgment was
be required to post a bond for the entire judgment when its liability does not extend to the entire
judgment.  Fairness . . . requires that the insurer be permitted to fulfill its covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by filing an appeal bond in an amount sufficient to cover the part of the judg-
ment for which it is liable . . . .”); Cansler v. Harrington, 643 P.2d 110, 115 (Kan. 1982) (stating
that an insurer may avoid being garnished by procuring a bond in the amount of its policy limits
rather than the full amount of the judgment); State ex rel. Brickner v. Saitz, 664 S.W.2d 209, 214
(Mo. 1984) (“There is no reason to put the insurance company to the choice of paying the plain-
tiff the full amount of its coverage, with restitution in the event of reversal possibly in jeopardy,
or of putting up a bond for the non-covered as well as the covered portion of the judgment so as
to provide effective coverage which the insured did not buy.”); Courvoisier v. Harley Davidson
of Trenton, Inc., 742 A.2d 542, 547 (N.J. 1999) (“We think that the majority rule is sensible.  The
relationship of the insured and the insurer in these circumstances is one of contractual indemnifi-
cation. . . . The insurer has agreed, in return for a premium, to be responsible to pay a judgment
against the insured up to the face amount of the insurance contract.” (citations omitted)). But
see Burford Equip. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1499, 1504–05 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(concluding that an insurer had to bond the full amount of the judgment where its policy stated
that if it defended a suit, it would pay in addition to the applicable limits of liability “premiums
on appeal bonds required in any such suit”).
206. Bowen, 451 So. 2d at 1198.
207. Id.
208. No. A-08-1041, 2009 WL 3381578 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2009).
209. Id. at *1.
210. Id. at *1–2.
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id.
213. Id. at *2.
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affirmed on appeal.214  Unable to collect his judgment from American
Family, Wiegert accepted $47,000 and an assignment of its claims
against American Family from Fretaco, which promptly went out of
business.215
Wiegert, as Fretaco’s assignee, then sued American Family for bad
faith and breach of contract, among other theories.216  He lost in the
trial court and his bad luck turned worse when he died after appealing
to the Nebraska Court of Appeals.217  Hedy Wiegert-Stathes, the per-
sonal representative of his estate, pursued the appeal.218
The trial court had found that American Family had no responsibil-
ity to obtain a supersedeas bond beyond its policy limits.219  The Wieg-
ert-Stathes court agreed:
[A] supersedeas bond becomes a guarantee of payment of the judg-
ment, and in exchange . . . the judgment creditor loses the right to
levy on its judgment during the . . . appeal.  Therefore . . . it be-
comes clear that the insurer’s duty to post a supersedeas bond . . . is
dependent on what coverage remains. . . . [I]f the judgment . . . is
more than the coverage, then the . . . requirements for supersedeas
bonds under [a Nebraska statute] necessarily result in an expansion
of the policy limits if such a bond is posted and the judgment is
upheld.  In that situation, the judgment debtor is underinsured and
has no rightful expectation that the judgment will be superseded
because doing so necessarily expands the policy limits.220
When it came time to appeal Wiegert’s judgment, American Family
had about $800 of its policy limits left, meaning that the policy was not
exhausted and it thus had a duty to defend Fretaco through appeal.221
But the bond for that appeal would have had to be for at least
$360,000, that being the amount of Wiegert’s judgment.222  The Wieg-
ert-Stathes court reasoned that if it were to require American Family
to post such a bond, and if the judgment was upheld, it would be “ju-
dicially enlarging” the policy limits from $500,000 to more than
$860,000.223  In other words, it would be imposing a burden on the
insurer “far greater than it contracted for and was paid premium for,
and on the other hand, the insured would gain a benefit it did not
contract for or pay premium for,” all of which would be “completely
214. Wiegert-Stathes, 2009 WL 3381578 at *2.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *3.
220. Wiegert-Stathes, 2009 WL 3381578 at *7.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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contrary to the explicit language of the policy limiting American Fam-
ily’s obligation to $500,000 per occurrence.”224  As a result, the Wieg-
ert-Stathes court affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of
American Family.225
The Wiegert-Stathes court noted that an insured concerned about
execution on the excess portion of a judgment may protect itself by
procuring a bond for that amount.226  The court in Bowen v. Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co.227 went a step further to hold that
while an insurer need not pay to bond a judgment that exceeds its
policy limits, its duty of good faith and fair dealing requires it “to as-
sist the insured in attempting to arrange bond for the excess
amount.”228  This holding is questionable at best because it appears to
create a new duty in the guise of good faith and fair dealing, even
though the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing relates to ex-
isting contractual duties—it does not create new ones.229  If a Bowen
duty does exist, the insurer should be able to satisfy it by referring the
insured to brokers who can help it procure a bond.230  It may be
enough that the insurer simply keeps the insured informed about the
status of the appeal so that she is positioned to protect herself against
personal liability.231  An insurer’s duty to assist the insured, if any,
cannot include furnishing collateral for the insured’s bond because re-
quiring the insurer to do so would effectively rewrite the policy to
impose a new obligation on the insurer.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *11.
226. Wiegert-Stathes, 2009 WL 3381578 at *7.
227. 451 So. 2d 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
228. Id. at 1198.
229. Armed Forces Bank, N.A. v. Hicks, 365 P.3d 378, 387 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014); Hanaway v.
Parkersburg Grp., LP, 132 A.3d 461, 471 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
230. If the policy disclaims an obligation to apply for or furnish appeal bonds, a Bowen duty
cannot include these activities or any other steps that might be reasonably so characterized be-
cause the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot alter or override express policy
language.  QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo. Apt. Ass’n, Inc., 94 So. 3d 541, 548 (Fla. 2012);
Dave’s Inc. v. Linford, 291 P.3d 427, 435 (Idaho 2012) (citing Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 104
P.3d 946, 952 (Idaho 2004)); Glenn v. HealthLink HMO, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 866, 877 (Mo. Ct. App.
2012); Landye Bennett Blumstein, LLP v. Jeffrey S. Mutnick, P.C., 346 P.3d 1265, 1274 (Or. Ct.
App. 2015); Young Living Essential Oils, LC v. Marin, 266 P.3d 814, 817 (Utah 2011); SAK &
Assocs., Inc. v. Ferguson Constr., Inc., 357 P.3d 671, 676 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Myers v.
State, 218 P.3d 241, 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)).
231. See Bowen, 451 So. 2d at 1198 (discussing the insurer’s satisfaction of its duty of good
faith and fair dealing).
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B. Bonds to Release Attachments
The supplementary payments provision in a standard CGL policy
states that the insurer will pay with respect to a claim it investigates or
settles, or a suit it defends, the “cost of bonds to release attachments,
but only for bond amounts within the applicable limit of insurance.”232
A common question, here again, is whether the insurer must pay for
bond amounts in excess of the liability limits of its policy.  The short
answer is no, as the Graf v. Hospitality Mutual Insurance Co.233 court
explained.
Hospitality Mutual Insurance Co. insured Torcia & Sons, Inc.
(Torcia), which owned the Fat Cat Bar & Grill.234  The insurance pol-
icy had liability limits of $500,000 per person.235  Katie Graf was hurt
at Fat Cat’s and sued Torcia.236  She was awarded $500,000 in damages
and just over $111,000 in pre-judgment interest.237  Hospitality denied
coverage for the pre-judgment interest award because it exceeded the
policy limits, so Graf attached Torcia’s liquor license to secure her ex-
cess judgment.238  When Graf and Torcia asked Hospitality to pay the
cost of a bond to release the attachment, Hospitality refused again
because the judgment exceeded its policy limits.239  So, Graf and
Torcia entered into a settlement agreement, whereby Graf released
the attachment on Torcia’s liquor license and Torcia assigned to her its
rights against Hospitality.240
Graf then sued Hospitality, which successfully moved to dismiss the
lawsuit.241  The district court determined that the $500,000 damage
award represented full recovery under the policy.242  To require Hos-
pitality to pay for the bond, the court reasoned, would “expand Hospi-
tality’s liability in contravention of the express terms of the Policy.”243
Graf appealed the dismissal to the First Circuit.
The First Circuit agreed with the district court that the Hospitality
policy was unambiguous.244  The supplementary payments provision
232. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13),
at 8 (2012).
233. 754 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2014).
234. Id. at 75.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Graf, 754 F.3d at 75–76.
240. Id. at 76.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 77.
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stated that Hospitality would pay the cost of bonds to release attach-
ment, but only insofar as they were for amounts “within the applicable
limit of insurance.”245  Here, the limit of insurance was reached
through the $500,000 damage award, and Hospitality had no obliga-
tion under its policy to pay the cost of a bond covering a prejudgment
interest award beyond that amount.246
Graf argued that Hospitality was obligated to pay for the bond be-
cause the bond amount of $115,000 was within the $500,000 policy
limit.247  The Graf court quickly dispatched this argument:
Taken to its conclusion, Graf’s argument would obligate Hospitality
to pay for a bond . . . so long as the amount of the bond was
$500,000 or less, irrespective of whether the coverage limit had al-
ready been reached, potentially increasing Hospitality’s exposure by
100% (or even more, depending on the applicability of the occur-
rence limitation).  This . . . makes no sense and cannot be squared
with the plain language of the [p]olicy.248
Furthermore, Graf’s position was belied by other policy provisions,
all of which made clear that Hospitality’s liability was confined to its
policy limits.249  The First Circuit reasoned that even if the meaning of
the supplementary payments provision, standing alone, was uncertain
(which it wasn’t), it would not provide the coverage Graf sought when
read in light of the policy’s other terms.250
Finally, Graf contended that because in Massachusetts attachment
bonds are available only where recoverable proceeds exceed available
liability insurance coverage, the Hospitality policy had to contemplate
an additional $500,000 liability limit for the cost of attachment
bonds.251  The court was not persuaded by this argument because it
could envision scenarios in which a plaintiff might obtain an attach-
ment for a bond amount within the limit of insurance for which Hospi-
tality would have to pay.252  For example, a court might order pretrial
attachment in a case where the nature and extent of the defendant’s
insurance coverage was uncertain.253
245. Graf, 754 F.3d at 77.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 78.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 893 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989)).
251. Graf, 754 F.3d at 79.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Erkan v. New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc., Nos. 12-12052-FDS, 12-
12066-FDS, 2012 WL 5896530, at *2 (D. Mass. Nov. 21, 2012)).
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The Graf court concluded that the Hospitality policy obligated the
company to pay the cost of bonds only for bond amounts that, to-
gether with any other liabilities, fell within the policy’s $500,000 liabil-
ity limit.254  It therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Graf’s
action.255
V. PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AS
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS
Bond costs are not the only judgment-related source of supplemen-
tary payment disputes—insurers’ obligations to pay pre- and post-
judgment interest are regularly litigated.256  For example, the supple-
mentary payments provision in a standard CGL policy states that the
insurer will pay in addition to its policy limits:
f. Prejudgment interest awarded against the insured on that part
of the judgment we pay.  If we make an offer to pay the applica-
ble limit of insurance, we will not pay any prejudgment interest
based on that period of time after the offer.
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues
after entry of the judgment and before we have paid, offered to
pay, or deposited in court the part of the judgment that is within
the applicable limit of insurance.257
Notably, paragraph (f) limits the insurer’s obligation to pay pre-
judgment interest to the portion of the judgment the insurer pays,
while paragraph (g) does not similarly limit the insurer’s obligation to
pay post-judgment interest.258
Supplementary payments provisions in personal lines policies typi-
cally provide that the insurer will pay only post-judgment interest.
For example, a standard personal auto policy states that the insurer
will pay on behalf of an insured, “[i]nterest accruing after a judgment
is entered in any suit we defend.  Our duty to pay interest ends when
we offer to pay that part of the judgment which does not exceed our
limit of liability for this coverage.”259  A standard homeowners policy
states that the insurer will pay in addition to its limits of liability: “In-
terest on the entire judgment which accrues after entry of the judg-
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Farquhar v. Alaska Nat’l Ins. Co., 20 P.3d 577, 579–80 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting
the insured’s argument that by agreeing in its supplementary payments provision to pay post-
judgment interest the insurer necessarily agreed to also pay prejudgment interest).
257. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13),
at 8–9 (2012).
258. Wright, supra note 10, at 68. R
259. ISO Props., Inc., Personal Auto Policy (PP 00 01 01 05), at 2 (2003).
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ment and before we pay or tender, or deposit in court that part of the
judgment which does not exceed the limit of liability that applies.”260
An insurer’s obligation to pay pre- or post-judgment interest as ex-
pressly stated in a supplementary payments provision obviously re-
quires a judgment.261  An insurer has no obligation to pay interest on
a settlement that it pays.262  A settlement, after all, is not a judgment.
A. The Scope of the Insurer’s Obligation to Pay
Post-Judgment Interest
As noted above, a standard CGL policy does not limit the insurer’s
obligation to pay post-judgment interest to the portion of the judg-
ment the insurer pays.  Rather, the insurer agrees to pay in addition to
its policy limits, interest on the full amount of any judgment that ac-
crues between entry of the judgment and the time the insurer pays,
offers to pay, or deposits into court that part of the judgment that is
within the applicable limit of insurance.263  Courts reviewing this lan-
guage and similar wording have rejected insurers’ attempts to confine
their post-judgment interest obligation to interest on that part of a
judgment for which they are liable, as compared to interest on the
entire judgment.264  In short, the policy language means what it says.
This point is sharpened by the preceding paragraph in the standard
CGL policy’s supplementary payments provision, which limits the in-
surer’s obligation to pay prejudgment interest awarded against the in-
sured to that part of the judgment the insurer pays.  It is logical to
260. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners–3 Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 21 (2010).
261. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Haley, 916 A.2d 952, 954 (Me. 2007); Liimatta v. Lukari,
460 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
262. See, e.g., Haley, 916 A.2d at 954 (holding that the insurer did not owe prejudgment inter-
est on a settlement it paid); Liimatta, 460 N.W.2d at 253 (“There was no judgment in this case
and thus no obligation to pay interest.”); Miller ex rel. Miller v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., No. 07-
98-0061-CV, 1999 WL 7892, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 11, 1999) (stating that “even if the policy
provided that Twin City would pay, in addition to the applicable limit of liability, prejudgment
interest awarded against the insured on that part of the judgment Twin City pays, there would
still have to be a judgment before Twin City has any obligation to indemnify [the insured]”).
263. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. R
264. See, e.g., Vazquez-Filippetti v. Cooperitiva de Seguros Multiples du Puerto Rico, 723 F.3d
24, 29 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing Puerto Rico law); Rockwell Automation, Inc. v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 544 F.3d 752, 759–61 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Protective Nat’l Ins. Co., 631 So. 2d 305, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Se. Atl. Cargo Operators, Inc. v. First State Ins. Co., 456 S.E.2d 101, 103–04 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1995); Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 87–88 (Kan. 1990); Davis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 747
N.E.2d 141, 146–47 (Mass. 2001); Burns v. Smith, 303 S.W.3d 505, 514 (Mo. 2010); In re Tichota’s
Estate, 215 N.W.2d 885, 887 (Neb. 1974); Weimer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 466, 473
(Wis. 1998).
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conclude that the insurer could have similarly limited its post-judg-
ment interest obligation if it wished to do so.
In Fratus v. Republic Western Insurance Co.,265 the court held that
Republic had to pay over $1 million in post-judgment interest even
though it was liable for only $25,000 of the subject judgment under its
umbrella policy.266  The Republic policy provided: “In addition to our
limit of liability, we will pay for the insured . . . [a]ll interest accruing
after the entry of judgment in a suit we defend.  Our duty to pay inter-
est ends when we pay or tender our limit of liability.”267  As the Fratus
court explained:
It may, at first, seem shocking to impose this immense obligation
on Republic for a failure to deliver a relatively small sum to the
plaintiffs.  Yet, the clear majority of modern courts that have inter-
preted a standard interest clause under similar circumstances have
concluded that the policies mean what they say. These opinions not
only apply the straightforward terms of the contracts, but produce
sound policy.  Compelling the insurer to pay all of the interest which
accrues pending appeal protects the insureds, who may wish to pay
the portion of the judgment in excess of policy limits and stop the
tolling of interest, but whose lack of control over the litigation pre-
vents them from doing so.  The rule also serves to protect plaintiffs
from unreasonable delay on the part of insurers, or, as in this case,
compensate them for such delays.  The rule does not impose an un-
fair burden on insurers because they remain in control of both the
tolling of interest and the litigation, and can fairly be expected to
understand how the majority of jurisdictions interpret standard in-
terest clauses.268
An insurer that wants to stop the running of post-judgment interest
must pay, offer to pay, or deposit into court that portion of the judg-
ment that is within the applicable policy limit.  To that option we now
turn.
B. Paying, Offering to Pay, or Depositing into Court the Covered
Portion of a Judgment
Standard liability policies provide that the insurer may limit its obli-
gation to pay pre- or post-judgment interest by satisfying specified
conditions.  Again, a standard CGL policy states that if the insurer
“make[s] an offer to pay the applicable limit of insurance, we will not
pay any prejudgment interest based on that period of time after the
265. 147 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1998)
266. Id. at 28–29.
267. Id. at 28.
268. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
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offer.”269  With respect to post-judgment interest, a standard CGL
policy provides that the insurer’s obligation to pay ends when it has
“paid, offered to pay, or deposited in court the part of the judgment
that is within the applicable limit of insurance.”270  A standard per-
sonal auto policy provides that the insurer’s “duty to pay interest ends
when [it offers] to pay that part of the judgment which does not ex-
ceed [its] limit of liability for this coverage.”271  Other policies use va-
rious forms of very similar language.
An insurer’s offer to pay its policy limits may be oral or written.272
The insurer need not furnish a check or draft at the time it offers to
pay its policy limits to make the offer effective.273  The insurer must,
however, convey the offer to the plaintiff; simply communicating the
offer to the insured is not sufficient.274
Courts frequently hold that an offer to pay policy limits must be
unconditional to terminate the insurer’s interest obligation.275  Some
courts distinguish between offers to pay and settlement offers, and
reason that an insurer’s offer to pay its policy limits in exchange for
the insured’s release will not extinguish the insurer’s post-judgment
269. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13),
at 8 (2012).
270. Id. at 9.
271. ISO Props., Inc., Personal Auto Policy (PP 00 01 01 05), at 2 (2003).
272. See, e.g., Colella v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 121338-U, ¶¶ 14–17
(holding letter confirming conversation to be sufficient); Sproles v. Greene, 407 S.E.2d 497,
502–04 (N.C. 1991) (finding oral offer to pay to be sufficient).
273. See, e.g., Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co., No. 1:02-CV-1875-LJM-WTL, 2004 WL
1689391, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2004) (rejecting the argument that Sentry had to formally
tender a check to the clerk of court to make an “offer”); Sproles, 407 S.E.2d at 504 (reasoning
that the insurer’s offer to pay was sufficient to terminate its post-judgment interest obligation
even though actual payment was made thirteen days later).
274. Richmond v. Nobel Ins. Co., 22 F. App’x 246, 247 (4th Cir. 2001); Great Am. Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. M2009-00833-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1712947, at *6–9 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 28, 2010).
275. See, e.g., Safeway Ins. Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 218, 220–21 (Ala.
1997) (holding that offers conditioned on the plaintiffs’ release of all claims against the insured
for liability in excess of the policy limits did not terminate the insurer’s post-judgment interest
obligation); Sours v. Russell, 967 P.2d 348, 355 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that the insurer’s
offer of its policy limits conditioned on the plaintiff’s promise not to execute on the insured’s
assets did not terminate the insurer’s post-judgment interest obligation); Davis v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 747 N.E.2d 141, 147–49 (Mass. 2001) (distinguishing an offer to pay, which requires an offer
to tender, and an offer to settle, and explaining that an offer to pay policy limits conditioned on
the plaintiff’s release of the insured did not terminate Allstate’s post-judgment interest obliga-
tion); Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, No. 03-97-00233-CV, 1997 WL 746027, at *3 (Tex. App.
Dec. 4, 1997) (“[I]f we were to allow the carrier to escape liability for postjudgment interest after
having made a conditional offer . . . the burden of postjudgment interest would fall entirely on
the insured.  This defeats both the purpose and the policy of the Supplementary Payment provi-
sion.  It would be unreasonable to think that a third party would ever release its claims against
an insured having a judgment in hand.”).
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interest obligation.276  Other courts reach the same result by interpret-
ing “offer to pay” to mean “tender,” which in common legal usage
describes an unconditional offer of money to satisfy an obligation.277
Not all courts require unconditional offers, however.278
For example, in Weimer v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,279 Paul
Weimer was badly hurt when his car was hit by a truck driven by Ron-
ald Trace.  Trace was insured under a Country Mutual business auto-
mobile policy with per person liability limits of $100,000.280  In an
initial letter, Country Mutual offered its $100,000 policy limits in “full
settlement” of Weimer’s claims against both it and Trace.281  Weimer
rejected the offer because he was still investigating other potential de-
fendants’ liability.282  In a subsequent letter, Country Mutual acknowl-
edged Weimer’s rejection but stated that its offer of its $100,000 policy
limits in exchange for a full release would remain open.283  Weimer
later sued Trace and Country Mutual, ultimately winning a judgment
of just over $610,000.284
The supplementary payments provision in the Country Mutual pol-
icy stated that Country Mutual would pay all interest accruing after
entry of a judgment against an insured, but that its duty ended when it
tendered its policy limits.285  Country Mutual argued that its letters
offering its policy limits in full settlement of all claims against it and
Trace were tenders that excused its obligation to pay interest.286  Wei-
mer argued in response that the letters failed the “common legal
meaning of ‘tender’” because (1) they were conditioned on settle-
ment, and (2) Country Mutual never surrendered control of the
money.287  Thus, he argued, Country Mutual owed interest on the full
276. See, e.g., Davis, 747 N.E.2d at 147–49.
277. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (10th ed. 2014); see also Levit v. Allstate Ins. Co., 764
N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (App. Div. 2003) (discussing a New York regulation requiring an insurer to
pay, tender or deposit its policy limits into court to cut off its post-judgment interest obligation).
278. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 266 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426–28 (Ct. App.
1990) (approving of an offer that included a requirement of “full settlement”); Campbell v. Tur-
ner, 744 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that an offer to pay coupled
with a request for the insured’s release terminated the insurer’s obligation to pay post-judgment
interest).
279. 575 N.W.2d 466 (Wis. 1998).
280. Id. at 468.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 468–69.
284. Id. at 469.
285. Weimer, 575 N.W.2d at 472–73.
286. Id. at 473.
287. Id.
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judgment.288  The trial court held for Country Mutual, but the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Black’s Law Dictionary to
bolster its application of “the well-known legal construction of the
word ‘tender.’”289  Country Mutual appealed this determination to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.290
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that Country Mutual had
tendered its policy limits and therefore did not owe post-judgment in-
terest.291  In doing so, the court disavowed the lower appellate court’s
resort to Black’s Law Dictionary, explaining that because the objec-
tive was “to determine the ordinary, common meaning of a word as
understood by a reasonable insured, guidance [was] more appropri-
ately sought in a non-legal dictionary.”292  Citing two such dictiona-
ries, the Weimer court concluded that Country Mutual’s letters
constituted tender of its policy limits.293  Country Mutual’s offer to
pay was “formal in the sense that it was presented to Weimer in writ-
ing and signed by counsel for Country Mutual.”294  Plus, Country Mu-
tual made the offer in accordance with its contractual obligations.295
The Weimer court further explained that the language in Country
Mutual’s two letters offering to pay the policy limits in exchange for
Trace’s release as well as its own did not constitute a condition that
would negate the court’s conclusion that Country Mutual had ten-
dered its limits.296  Requiring Trace’s release was critical to the court’s
analysis because it was “an integral part of Country Mutual’s duty to
defend Trace.”297  Indeed, had it not requested Trace’s release, Coun-
try Mutual might have exposed itself to bad faith liability.298
In Overbeek v. Heimbecker,299 Richard Hellenbrand allowed his
drunken friend, Charles Heimbecker, to drive his car while he rode as
a passenger.  Heimbecker veered across the center line and struck
Brian Overbeek’s motorcycle, catastrophically injuring Overbeek.300
Overbeek’s only possible source of compensation was Hellenbrand’s
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 468.
291. Weimer, 575 N.W.2d at 474.
292. Id. at 473.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 473–74.
297. Weimer, 575 N.W.2d at 474.
298. Id.
299. 101 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1996).
300. Id. at 1226–27.
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$25,000 auto policy with General Casualty.301  General Casualty made
13 policy limits offers to settle, but Overbeek rejected them all.302  In-
stead, he took the case to trial and won a $2.2 million judgment
against Heimbecker and Hellenbrand.303
After years of delays, Overbeek claimed that General Casualty
owed post-judgment interest on the $2.2 million judgment.304  The
General Casualty policy stated that the company’s obligation to pay
post-judgment interest ended once it offered to pay its policy limits.305
The district court concluded that General Casualty had no duty to pay
the interest that Overbeek sought and he appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.306
The Overbeek court reasoned that requiring General Casualty to
pay interest on the $2.2 million judgment would make no sense.307
Post-judgment interest is intended to encourage prompt payment of
judgments and compensate a plaintiff for another party’s use of its
money.308  General Casualty “could not have been more prompt” in
offering its policy limit.309  Plus, the $2.2 million judgment was against
Heimbecker and Hellenbrand, not General Casualty.  It followed that
General Casualty could not have unfairly retained use of the money
and did not owe interest on the entire judgment.310
In conclusion, “[o]nce General Casualty offered the policy limits, it
was no longer on the hook for any interest.”311  The Overbeek court
accordingly affirmed the district court judgment in favor of General
Casualty.312
Interestingly, the Overbeek court allowed General Casualty to ter-
minate its post-judgment interest obligation through pre-judgment set-
tlement offers.  Other courts hold that to terminate its post-judgment
interest obligation, an insurer must make a post-judgment offer to
pay.313  In Gann v. Oltesvig,314 for example, the policy provided that
301. Id. at 1227.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1227–28.
305. Overbeek, 101 F.3d at 1227–28.
306. Id. at 1227.
307. Id. at 1228.
308. Id. (citing Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Wis. 1981)).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Overbeek, 101 F.3d at 1228.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Gann v. Oltesvig, 508 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657–58 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (applying Wiscon-
sin law); Sours v. Russell, 967 P.2d 348, 354 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (“Obviously, prejudgment
offers cannot include interest on a judgment which has not yet been entered.”); Lancer Ins. Co.
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the insurer, RLI, would pay “[a]ll interest on the full amount of any
judgment that accrues after entry of the judgment in any ‘suit’ against
the ‘insured’ we defend; but our duty to pay interest ends when we
have paid, offered to pay or deposited in court the part of the judg-
ment that is within our Limit of Insurance.”315  The court observed
that the provision referred to RLI’s offer to pay the portion of the
judgment that was within its policy limits.316  Because there is no pre-
trial judgment, the court believed that it would be unreasonable to
read this provision as contemplating termination of RLI’s duty to pay
post-judgment interest through a pretrial offer.317 The Gann court
thus concluded that this provision was triggered only after a judgment
had been entered.318
Regardless of whether the insurer chooses to offer its applicable
policy limit, pay it, or deposit it into court, the plaintiff may contend
that the insurer’s action does not stop the clock on its interest obliga-
tion unless the amount offered, paid, or deposited includes interest
then accrued.319  A majority of courts have rejected this argument.320
This is the correct result.  To hold otherwise would contravene the
plain language of the policy.321  This does not mean, however, that the
insurer can avoid paying accrued post-judgment interest.  It means
only that the insurer need not include that amount in its terminating
offer, payment, or deposit.322
v. Sunrise Removal, Inc., 914 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (App. Div. 2010) (requiring a final judgment
before the insurer could terminate its obligation to pay post-judgment interest).
314. 508 F. Supp. 2d 654 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
315. Id. at 657.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 657–58.
318. Id. at 658.
319. Wright, supra note 10, at 73. R
320. See, e.g., Vazquez-Filippetti v. Cooperitiva de Seguros Multiples du P.R., 723 F.3d 24, 29
(1st Cir. 2013) (discussing Puerto Rico law); Cox v. Peerless Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 83, 87 (D.
Conn. 1991) (applying Connecticut law); S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 489 S.E.2d 53, 56–57 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997); White v. Auto Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 984 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Levit
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 764 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (App. Div. 2003). But see Grimes v. Swaim, 971 F.2d
622, 624–26 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Oklahoma law); Sours v. Russell, 967 P.2d 348, 354 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1998) (requiring the insurer to pay post-judgment interest until tender of the amount
due under the policy); Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 947 S.W.2d 592, 606
(Tex. App. 1997) (requiring offer or payment of accrued post-judgment interest in addition to
limit of liability to terminate post-judgment interest obligation).
321. Vazquez-Filippetti, 723 F.3d at 30.
322. As a practical matter, an insurer may choose to include accrued post-judgment interest in
any sum offered, paid, or deposited into court to terminate its post-judgment interest obligation.
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VI. FIRST AID OR GOOD SAMARITAN CLAUSES
Some supplementary payments provisions state that the insurance
company will pay, in addition to the policy limits, certain medical ex-
penses that the insured incurs.  A personal auto policy might state:
“We will repay an insured person for . . . any expense incurred for first
aid to others at the time of an auto accident involving the insured
auto.”323  Or, a policy might state: “In addition to our limit of liability,
we will pay these benefits as respects an insured person. . . . Expenses
you incur for immediate medical and surgical treatment for others
necessary and the time of the accident resulting in bodily injury cov-
ered by this [policy].”324  These clauses are described as “first aid” or
“Good Samaritan” clauses.
Plaintiffs sometimes claim that a first aid or Good Samaritan clause
is intended to benefit them, such that the insurer must pay their medi-
cal expenses (leaving the policy’s liability limits available for settle-
ment or to pay a judgment).  Or, a plaintiff may claim that by injuring
her, the insured “incurred” expenses for her medical care under a first
aid or Good Samaritan clause.  These arguments do not hold water.
Starting with fundamental principles, first aid or Good Samaritan
clauses are a form of first party coverage; they are intended to benefit
the insured.325  They are not intended to benefit third parties who are
injured as a result of the insured’s conduct.326  A third party has no
standing to enforce a Good Samaritan or first aid clause.327  The ques-
tion is whether the insured incurred expenses for another person’s im-
mediate medical care, such as by agreeing or promising to pay for that
treatment, in turn obligating the insurer to reimburse the insured or
pay the medical provider on the insured’s behalf.328
Furthermore, these clauses are meant to cover expenses incurred by
an insured for immediate medical treatment of another, such as care
provided at the accident scene or in an ambulance en route to a hospi-
tal.  At the latest, immediate medical or surgical treatment might take
323. Allstate Ins. Co., Allstate Auto Insurance Policy (AU127-1), at 3–4, http://doi.nv.gov/
uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Consumers/AU127-1.pdf.
324. Farmers Ins. Grp., E-Z Reader Car Policy (56-5058 3d ed. 5-07), at 5, http://doi.nv.gov/up
loadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Consumers/56-5058.pdf.
325. Mulvey Constr., Inc. v. BITCO Gen. Life Ins. Corp., No. 1:07-0634, 2015 WL 6394521, at
*8 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 22, 2015); Town & Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 538 N.E.2d 6, 10 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1989); McCarter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 N.Y.S.2d 732 (App. Div. 1976); Dalrymple v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 380 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Super. Ct. 1976); DeMent v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 544 S.E.2d 797, 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
326. Town & Country Mut. Ins. Co., 538 N.E.2d at 10; Dalrymple, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
327. DeMent, 544 S.E.2d at 801.
328. McCarter, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 732 (referring to reimbursement of the insured by the insurer).
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the form of diagnostic, critical care, or lifesaving procedures in a hos-
pital emergency room or trauma center.329
The temporal limitation is clearest where the policy refers to “first
aid,” which is “[e]mergency treatment administered to an injured or
sick person before professional medical care is available.”330  In fact, if
a policy confines any payment to “first aid” expenses, the cost of care
provided by an ambulance crew should not be compensable because
paramedics and emergency medical technicians deliver “professional
medical care.”331  Even under the most liberal interpretation of “im-
mediate” medical treatment, a first aid or Good Samaritan clause sim-
ply does not apply to the vast majority of an injured person’s post-
accident care.332
Wherever courts draw the line between immediate medical or surgi-
cal treatment for which an insurer has to reimburse an insured and
other medical care for which the insurer has no obligation, the insured
must first “incur” the associated expenses.  That is, the insured must
agree or promise to be primarily responsible for paying them.333  An
insured who simply seeks emergency aid for an injured person does
329. See Gilbert v. Am. Cas. Co., 27 S.E.2d 431, 433 (W. Va. 1943) (explaining when a lay
person might consider certain surgical intervention to be “immediately imperative”).
330. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 664 (5th ed. 2011).
331. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, No. 6:09-cv-01532, 2011 WL 3607950, at
*4 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 15, 2011) (finding that “the first aid clause covers the costs, if any, incurred
in providing immediate emergency medical care, rendered at the scene of the accident before
trained medical personnel arrived and assumed control of [the plaintiff’s] care” (emphasis ad-
ded)); see also Abramson v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 480 F. App’x 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2012)
(“[A] common understanding of ‘first aid’ does not encompass the use of an oxygen tank or
AED . . . . Rather, “first aid” involves simple procedures that can be performed with minimal
equipment and training, such as bandaging and repositioning.  CPR—which [the decedent] indis-
putably received—lies at the outer limit of the term.”); Pacello v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., No.
CV030477014S, 2006 WL 1102737, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2006) (discussing an inn-
keeper’s duty to protect guests and stating that “first aid requires no more assistance than that
which can be provided by an untrained person”); L.A. Fitness Int’l, LLC v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d
550, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the obligation to provide first aid to business
invitees “does not encompass the duty to perform skilled treatment, such as CPR”).
332. See, e.g., Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Lacayo, No. 2:07cv809-MHT, 2008 WL 4831743,
at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2008) (observing that “first aid expenses” did not include the cost of
emergency room treatment, which did not qualify as first aid); Vega v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.,
401 So. 2d 368, 374 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (finding no obligation to pay where the plaintiffs in-
curred massive medical bills, but there was no evidence that the insureds incurred any expense
for immediate medical or surgical treatment).
333. See, e.g., Martinez v. Gulf Ins. Co., 358 P.2d 1003, 1007 (N.M. 1961) (determining that the
insurer was liable under a Good Samaritan clause where the insured’s wife promised a doctor
that she and the insured “would be responsible for all expenses” necessary for the accident
victim’s emergency treatment). But cf. Gilbert, 27 S.E.2d at 435 (finding that the insured in-
curred no expenses for purposes of a Good Samaritan clause where his promise to pay was at
most a guaranty and the hospital’s practice was to treat emergency patients without regard for
payment).
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not thereby incur the associated expense.334  An insured who injures
another person does not by mere operation of tort liability incur that
person’s medical expenses for purposes of a first aid or Good Samari-
tan clause.335 Gaines ex rel. Walton v. Allstate Insurance Co.336 is
illustrative.
The plaintiff in Gaines obtained a $15,700,000 judgment against All-
state’s insured, which dwarfed Allstate’s policy limits.337  The plaintiff
then moved for judgment against Allstate.338  She argued that the first
aid clause in the Allstate policy provided “unlimited coverage which
would pay all or a part of” her excess judgment against the insured.339
Under that clause, Allstate agreed to pay in addition to the applicable
limit of liability, “expenses incurred by the insured for such immediate
medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time
of an accident involving an automobile insured hereunder and not due
to war.”340  According to the plaintiff, this language was ambiguous,
and thus had to be construed in favor of coverage.341
The Gaines court rejected the plaintiff’s ambiguity argument as
lawyerly sleight of hand,342 explaining that “[i]n the ordinary meaning
of the words used, the clause provides ‘first aid’ coverage to the in-
sured for expenses incurred by him for care of the injured at the time
of the accident; nothing more, nothing less.”343  In any event, the court
334. See Gilbert, 27 S.E.2d at 435 (involving an insured who drove his two injured passengers
to a hospital).
335. Ross v. Allstate Ins. Co., Case No. LA-1404-3, 1996 WL 1065668, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec.
20, 1996).  A plaintiff cannot avoid this rule by reference to a dictionary that defines “incur” as
“[t]o become liable or subject to as a result of one’s actions.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 889 (5th ed. 2011).  Again, words used in an insurance
policy must be read in context, and the use of the dictionary definition of “incur” in the fashion
attributed to creative plaintiffs here would violate that rule.  As Judge Posner once wrote in
explaining the role reasonableness plays in interpreting insurance policy language:
[A]n interpretation of an insurance policy is not rendered doubtful . . . just because a
snippet of contractual language taken out of context provides literal support to the
insured’s position.  That way madness lies.  Suppose you order a Cosmopolitan in a bar,
and the bartender gives you a copy of the woman’s magazine and insists that you pay
for it; can he appeal to literal meaning to defeat your contention that it is not what you
agreed to?
Great W. Cas. Co. v. Mayorga, 342 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
336. No. LF-1879-3, 2000 WL 33258522 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000).
337. Id. at *1.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Gaines, 2000 WL 33258522, at *1 (“Any language can be made to appear ambiguous
especially when skilled lawyers attempt to make it so.  That is the nature of the ambiguity
here.”).
343. Id.
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reasoned, the clause did not provide for payment of a judgment that
included within the damages medical expenses incurred by an injured
party.344
The plaintiff countered that the judgment against the insured meant
that he had “incurred liability for medical expenses” under the pol-
icy.345  The court disagreed.
The judgment is a determination that the tortfeasor is indebted to
the plaintiff for damages sustained in the accident.  It does not es-
tablish any debt to health care providers notwithstanding the statu-
tory lien given them.  The lien simply requires that, where payment
is made by a tortfeasor, he must pay the lienor before paying any-
one else. . . . It does not give the lienor an independent cause of
action against the tortfeasor. At best, the tortfeasor has an obligation
to the plaintiff for damages sustained which may include medical ex-
penses which she incurred.  The tortfeasor has incurred no obligation
to pay any expenses described in the supplemental payments clause;
the clause cannot, therefore, apply to plaintiff’s claim.346
The Gaines court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to state a
cause of action against Allstate.347  It therefore dismissed her motion
for judgment.348
In reaching its decision, the Gaines court cited another case from
the same court, Ross v. Allstate Insurance Co.,349 which involved an
identical Good Samaritan clause.350  In Ross, Allstate argued that its
obligation under the clause was limited to reimbursing the insured,
Kevin Dawson, for out-of-pocket emergency medical expenses he in-
curred.351  Plaintiff Barbara Ross, on the other hand, asserted that
“medical expenses are incurred when one ‘pays or is legally obligated
to pay’ for them.”352  She contended that by incurring liability for
damages resulting from their accident, Dawson became legally bound
to pay her emergency medical bills in the approximate amount of
$70,000.353
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. (emphasis added).
347. Id. at *2.
348. Gaines, 2000 WL 33258522, at *2.
349. No. LA-1404-3, 1996 WL 1065668 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 1996).
350. Compare Gaines, 2000 WL 33258522, at *1 (quoting the Allstate policy), with Ross, 1996
WL 1065688, at *1 (quoting the Allstate policy).  The plaintiff in Gaines argued that Ross was
inapposite because in her case, unlike in Ross, “judgment ha[d] been rendered against the in-
sured tortfeasor which establishe[d] that he ha[d] incurred liability for medical expenses of the
type described in the policy.” Gaines, 2000 WL 33258522, at *1.  The Gaines court rejected this
argument. Id.
351. Ross, 1996 WL 1065688, at *1.
352. Id. (quoting Va. Farm Bureau v. Hodges, 385 S.E.2d 612, 614 (Va. 1989)).
353. Id.
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The question for the Ross court, then, was “what exactly does an
individual ‘incur’ when he or she becomes liable in an accident?”354
The court answered that question as follows:
The liability incurred by the tortfeasor, Dawson, was not to pay
[Ross’s] medical bills, but to make her whole.  If [Ross] had in-
curred medical bills, she still would have had a cause of action
against Dawson.  By insuring the liability for the accident, Dawson
[did] not incur [Ross’s] medical bills.  Had [Ross] not paid the bills
herself, the doctors would have [had] no cause of action against
Dawson directly.  Dawson’s liability [was] to reimburse [Ross] for
her injuries. Damages may be calculated, in part, by adding together
medical bills, but Dawson is not liable to pay those medical bills
directly.355
Although Ross was correct that the term “incurred” includes the
legal obligation to pay a debt as well as the actual payment of a debt,
the debt Dawson became legally obligated to pay was not Ross’s med-
ical expenses, but the damages that she suffered.356  Allstate’s duty to
indemnify Dawson for those damages was determined by the liability
limits of its policy, which were $25,000.357  The first aid clause afforded
Ross no further source of recovery.358  The Ross court therefore
granted Allstate summary judgment.359
Gaines and Ross were correctly decided.  The plaintiffs in both
cases cited Cox v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.360 in support of
their positions,361 but that case is not persuasive.  Certainly, Cox did
not influence the Gaines and Ross courts.
In Cox, motorcyclist Daniel Cox was hurt in a collision with fellow
motorcyclist Joe Egemo.362  Cox accumulated over $100,000 in medi-
cal bills.363  Egemo’s insurance policy with Progressive had a $50,000
per person liability limit.364  Progressive paid Cox $50,000, but he
sought a declaratory judgment in an effort to recover more under the
354. Id. at *2.
355. Id.
356. Id. at *3; see also Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 541 (Mo. 2010) (explaining that when
a plaintiff sues to recover damages for bodily injury, “the item of damage for which recovery is
sought is the value of services rendered, not a reimbursement of amounts paid by a collateral
source”).
357. Ross, 1996 WL 1065668, at *3.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. 869 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1994).
361. Gaines ex rel. Walton v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. LF-1879-3, 2000 WL 33258522, at *1 (Va.
Ct. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (citing Cox v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1994)); Ross,
1996 WL 1065668, at *1 (citing Cox, 869 P.2d at 467).
362. Cox, 869 P.2d at 468.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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policy’s Good Samaritan clause.365  That clause stated: “In addition to
our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a covered person. . . .
Expenses incurred for immediate medical treatment required by
others you injure with your cycle except for passengers on your cy-
cle.”366  Specifically, Cox asked the court to determine the meaning of
“immediate medical treatment.”367
The trial court concluded that Progressive was obligated to pay the
cost of care rendered to Cox before he was admitted to the hospital.368
On appeal, however, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the
policy’s reference to “immediate medical treatment” meant that it
covered “all medical care up until that point where treatment [be-
came] recuperative or rehabilitative in nature.”369  The court reasoned
that whether medical care is recuperative or rehabilitative depends on
the facts; there is no bright-line test.370  Nonetheless, in dicta,371 the
Cox court offered that the phrase “immediate medical treatment”
contemplated both “on-site first aid treatment and emergency room-
type care.”372  In yet more dicta, the court observed that a policy like
Progressive’s “generally will cover any medical treatment, directly at-
tributable to the insured event and without any intervening cause, rea-
sonably believed necessary to prevent loss of life, serious impairment
to body functions, serious or permanent dysfunction of any body part
or organ, or any other serious medical consequence.”373
Cox is no authority for whether an insured “incurs” medical ex-
penses by mere operation of tort law because the court never decided
that issue. Gaines and Ross are proper guides for other courts consid-
ering the question.  If a plaintiff did cite Cox on that point, the opin-
ion would be inapposite in most cases because the Good Samaritan
clause in Cox stated that Progressive would pay “[e]xpenses incurred
for immediate medical treatment required by others,”374 not medical
expenses the insured incurred for the immediate medical treatment of
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Cox, 869 P.2d at 468.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 469.
371. Everything in the Cox opinion concerning the meaning of “immediate medical treat-
ment” after the statement that whether medical treatment is recuperative or rehabilitative is a
fact-based inquiry for which there is no bright-line test is dicta, because it was not necessary to
the outcome of the case. See United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292–93 (7th Cir. 1988)
(explaining what makes a statement in a legal opinion dictum).
372. Cox, 869 P.2d at 469–70.
373. Id. at 470.
374. Id. at 468.
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others, as is true in most policies with first aid clauses.375  Indeed, that
difference in policy wording is the reason the Gaines and Ross courts
found Cox unpersuasive.376  Finally, even a first aid or Good Samari-
tan clause that does not refer to expenses the insured incurs should
still not expose an insurer to liability to a third party because that
result would require a court to read the clause in isolation from the
rest of the supplementary payments provision.  A court cannot do
that; it must read the clause in context.377
In summary, a first aid or Good Samaritan clause benefits the in-
sured; it does not benefit a third party who is injured as a result of the
insured’s conduct.  Insurers have no duty under these clauses to pay
third parties’ medical expenses.  Rather, where an insured agrees or
promises to pay for an injured person’s immediate medical treatment,
the insurer may have to reimburse the insured for appropriate ex-
penses or pay those expenses on the insured’s behalf (to fulfill the
insured’s obligation) regardless of the insured’s fault.378  An insured
does not by virtue of potential tort liability or liability created by a
judgment incur someone’s medical expenses for purposes of a first aid
or Good Samaritan clause.  Similarly, an insured who admits fault for
an accident should not be held to have incurred an injured person’s
emergency medical expenses under a first aid or Good Samaritan
clause.
Where an insured promises or agrees to pay for an injured person’s
immediate medical treatment, the injured person or her family may
terminate that obligation.  The arrival of the injured person’s spouse,
partner, or parent at the scene of the accident, or at the hospital or
other facility to which the injured person is transported, by itself ter-
minates the insured’s obligation to pay.379  Unlike the insured, that
person has the authority to consent to or guide the injured person’s
treatment, and he or she should thus assume related financial respon-
sibility.380  Similarly, if an injured person or her family member pro-
vides the medical provider with insurance information so that her
375. See supra notes 323–24324 and accompanying text. R
376. Gaines ex rel. Walton v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. LF-1879-3, 2000 WL 33258522, at *1 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000); Ross v. Allstate Ins. Co., Case No. LA-1404-3, 1996 WL 1065668, at *2 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 1996).
377. Ritrama, Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 796 F.3d 962, 970 (8th Cir. 2015); Hartford
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swift Distrib., Inc., 326 P.3d 253, 259 (Cal. 2014) (quoting Bank of the W. v.
Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 552 (Cal. 1992)); CT Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 9
N.Y.S.3d 220, 224 (App. Div. 2015).
378. McCarter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 N.Y.S.2d 732, 732 (App. Div. 1976) (referring to
reimbursement).
379. Gilbert v. Am. Cas. Co., 27 S.E.2d 431, 435 (W. Va. 1943).
380. Id.
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insurer or the family’s insurer may be billed for the cost of care, that
should terminate the insured’s assumed duty to pay and thus the in-
surer’s reimbursement obligation.
VII. PAYING DEFENSE EXPENSES FOR AN INSURED’S
CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITEE
Finally, there is the issue of an insurer’s payment for the defense of
an insured’s contractual indemnitee.  By way of background, it is com-
mon for a commercial insured to agree to defend and indemnify an-
other party—perhaps a property owner, landlord, or general
contractor—against tort liability arising out of the insured’s conduct.
In this situation, the insured’s CGL carrier may have to indemnify the
insured for the assumed liability if the agreement imposing the indem-
nity obligation is an “insured contract” as defined in the policy and the
bodily injury or property damage at issue occurred after the agree-
ment was executed.381  But who is responsible for paying the indemni-
tee’s defense costs in the event of litigation within the scope of the
indemnity agreement?  The supplementary payments provision in the
current version of the standard CGL policy addresses this issue:
If we defend an insured against a “suit” and an indemnitee of the
insured is also named as a party to the “suit”, we will defend that
indemnitee if all of the following conditions are met:
a. The “suit” against the indemnitee seeks damages for which
the insured has assumed the liability of the indemnitee in a
contract or agreement that is an “insured contract”;
b. This insurance applies to such liability assumed by the
insured;
c. The obligation to defend, or the cost of the defense of, that
indemnitee, has also been assumed by the insured in the same
“insured contract”;
d. The allegations in the “suit” and the information we know
about the “occurrence” are such that no conflict appears to
exist between the interests of the insured and the interests of
the indemnitee;
381. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04
13), at 2 (2012) (setting forth the contractual liability exclusion and its exceptions); id. at 14
(defining an “insured contract”).  It is important to remember that the exceptions to the contrac-
tual liability exclusion in a CGL policy do not confer coverage; any coverage derives from the
insuring agreement in the indemnitor’s CGL policy.  In essence, the contractual liability exclu-
sion takes away the coverage provided under the CGL insuring agreement, but the insured con-
tract exception protects the insured by giving back this coverage.  Douglas R. Richmond,
Contractual Liability Coverage, in CONSTRUCTION-RELATED INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 42,
42 (DEF. RESEARCH INST. 1997).  A thorough analysis of contractual liability coverage is beyond
the scope of this article.
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e. The indemnitee and the insured ask us to conduct and control
the defense of that indemnitee against such “suit” and agree
that we can assign the same counsel to defend the insured and
the indemnitee; and
f. The indemnitee:
(1) Agrees in writing to:
(a) Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or
defense of the “suit”;
(b) Immediately send us copies of any demands, notices,
summonses or legal papers received in connection with
the “suit”;
(c) Notify any other insurer whose coverage is available
to the indemnitee; and
(d) Cooperate with us with respect to coordinating other
applicable insurance available to the indemnitee; and
(2) Provides us with written authorization to:
(a) Obtain records and other information related to the
“suit”; and
(b) Conduct and control the defense of the indemnitee in
such “suit”.
So long as the above conditions are met, attorneys’ fees incurred
by us in the defense of that indemnitee, necessary litigation ex-
penses incurred by us and necessary litigation expenses incurred by
the indemnitee at our request will be paid as Supplementary Pay-
ments.  Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 2.b.(2) of Sec-
tion I – Coverage A – Bodily Injury And Property Damage
Liability, such payments will not be deemed to be damages for
“bodily injury” and “property damage” and will not reduce the lim-
its of insurance.
Our obligation to defend an insured’s indemnitee and to pay for
attorneys’ fees and necessary litigation expenses as Supplementary
Payments ends when we have used up the applicable limit of insur-
ance in the payment of judgments or settlements or the conditions
set forth above, or the terms of the agreement described in Para-
graph f. above, are no longer met.382
This part of the supplementary payments provision is again in-
tended to benefit the insured.383  It does not afford coverage to the
382. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (CG 00 01 04 13),
at 9 (2012).
383. Mulvey Constr., Inc. v. BITCO Gen. Life Ins. Corp., No. 1:07-0634, 2015 WL 6394521, at
*8 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 22, 2015) (applying Virginia law); see also Berg v. Gulf Underwriters Ins.
Co., 756 N.W.2d 478, 2008 WL 2522341, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. June 26, 2008) (stating that this part
of the supplementary payments provision is intended to benefit the insured and the insurer, and
explaining that rationale).
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insured’s indemnitee or transform the indemnitee into an insured.384
It does not make an indemnitee an additional insured under the pol-
icy.385  At most, an indemnitee is an incidental beneficiary of the
policy.386
As a result of the many conditions attached to the insurer’s promise
to defend the insured’s indemnitee and to treat the related litigation
expenses as supplementary payments, this provision will apply in very
few circumstances.387  Indeed, if any one condition fails the provision
will not apply.388 Nordby Construction, Inc. v. American Safety In-
demnity Co.389 is a representative case.
Summit State Bank contracted with Nordby Construction to build a
bank.390  Nordby subcontracted with Kenyon Construction to install a
watertight EIFS system on the bank’s exterior.391  Nordby’s subcon-
tract with Kenyon required Kenyon to “defend and indemnify
[Nordby] against any loss or liability arising out of, or in connection
with, [Kenyon’s] operations to be perform[ed] under the agree-
ment.”392  The EIFS system leaked, and Summit sued Nordby and all
of its subcontractors.393  Nordby cross-claimed against Kenyon for in-
demnity and tendered its defense to Kenyon, which Kenyon denied.394
The construction defect litigation settled and insurance coverage liti-
gation followed.  In the coverage case, the parties disputed whether
Kenyon’s CGL insurer, Ace American Insurance Co. (Ace), had a
duty to defend Nordby as Kenyon’s contractual indemnitee under
supplementary payments provisions identical to the one quoted
384. W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Century Sur. Co., 32 F. Supp. 3d 443, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (apply-
ing New York law).
385. Mulvey Constr., Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 571 F. App’x 150, 161 (4th Cir. 2014)
(applying Virginia law); Hargob Realty Assocs., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 901 N.Y.S.2d
657, 660 (App. Div. 2010).
386. Berg, 2008 WL 2522341, at *7.
387. See, e.g., Mulvey Constr., Inc., 2015 WL 6394521, at *11–14 (finding that the policy did
not apply because a subcontract was not an “insured contract,” the subcontract did not obligate
the insured to defend the indemnitee, there was a conflict of interest between the insured, and
the indemnitee, and the indemnitee did not meet its obligations to the insurer); Nordby Constr.,
Inc. v. Am. Safety Indem. Co., Case No. 14-CV-04074-LHK, 2015 WL 1737654, at *12–13 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (concluding that the policy did not apply because there was a conflict of
interest between the insured and its indemnitee and, further, because of the conflict, the insured
and the indemnitee could not agree to common defense counsel).
388. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 3d at 451.
389. No. 14-CV-04074-LHK, 2015 WL 1737654 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015).
390. Id. at *1.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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above.395  The Nordby court held that Ace had no duty to defend
Nordby.396
Ace successfully argued that Nordby could not show the absence of
a conflict of interest with Kenyon, which was a condition precedent to
Ace’s duty to defend a contractual indemnitee of Kenyon’s.397  In fact,
Nordby’s cross-claim against Kenyon presented a clear conflict of in-
terest.398  The presence of that conflict also meant that Nordby and
Kenyon could not agree to joint representation, which was another
condition precedent to Ace’s duty to defend an indemnitee.399
The Nordby court could find no California caselaw prohibiting an
insurer from conditioning its duty to defend a contractual indemnitee
on the absence of a conflict of interest between the insured and the
indemnitee.400  Relatedly, California law did not appear to require an
insurer to provide a contractual indemnitee with independent counsel
in the event of a conflict of interest with the insured.401  For these and
other reasons, the Nordby court granted Ace’s motion to dismiss the
complaint.402
An indemnitee may not always want its indemnitor’s insurer to de-
fend it.403  The indemnitee may not want to accept all of the condi-
tions in the supplementary payments provision in a CGL policy when
those conditions do not appear in the indemnity agreement.404  In par-
ticular, the indemnitee may not want to (1) surrender control of its
defense to the insurer; or (2) notify its own insurer of the suit and
potentially obligate that insurer to share related costs, which may de-
grade the indemnitee’s loss experience and potentially affect its future
insurance costs as a result.405  In those instances, any defense obliga-
tion will remain with the indemnitor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A supplementary payments provision is an essential part of a liabil-
ity insurance policy.  For example, the insurer’s obligation under this
395. Nordby, 2015 WL 1737654, at *12.
396. Id. at *13.
397. Id.
398. See id. at *12 (outlining Ace’s argument).
399. See id. at *13 (reprising Ace’s argument).
400. Id.
401. Nordby, 2015 WL 1737654, at *13.
402. Id. at *14.
403. Robert H. Etnyre, Jr. & Marcus R. Tucker, Eleven Issues Regarding Contractual Liability
Coverage, 11 J. TEX. INS. L. 2, 7 (2011).
404. Id.
405. See id. (discussing the indemnitee’s likely unwillingness to notify its own CGL insurer of
the lawsuit).
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provision to pay defense costs in addition to the liability limits of its
policy is critical because defense costs can—and frequently do—ex-
ceed a policy’s liability limits.  At the same time, a supplementary pay-
ments provision is not a cornucopia of benefits for either the insured
or third parties who are injured or damaged as a result of the insured’s
conduct.  Indeed, a supplementary payments provision does not give a
third party any rights under the policy.  Third parties are at most inci-
dental beneficiaries of a supplementary payments provision and there-
fore cannot sue to enforce it.
As important as supplementary payments provisions are to policy-
holders and insurers alike, there are relatively few cases discussing
them and secondary sources are similarly scarce.  As a result, courts
and lawyers have relatively little authority to guide their analysis or
reasoning when attempting to address related issues.  With any luck,
this Article helps remedy that deficiency.
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